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INTRODUCTION 
In the general area of freedom of information there 
exists a paradox in that no two people agree, yet many are 
"experts," on how much information should be released, what 
kind, when, to whom, in what manner, under what circum .. 
stances, how often., and in what context. 
Considering the number of variables involve4 it is 
not surprising that the opinion continuum is heavily 
weighted at each end, with fallow middle ground. There is 
either so little information released that the public is 
denied knewledge of how its government is ~unctioning, or 
too much released which is detrimental to the security of 
the United States. Some examples of these views are: 
Unfortunately, there has existed and still does ex .. 
ist in high governmental and military circles a 
strange psychosis that the governmeBt's business is 
net the people 6 s business. For reasons less clear, 
high governm~nt officials persist in giving lip 
service to the fact that the people have a right to :
1 know but in actual practice they circumvent this I, 
right to the people. Government officials have a ii ,. 
growing tendency to forget that in a democracy it '1\ 
is up to the people to make final decisions and 11 
that it is impossible unless the necessary infor= 
mation is available on which to base suca decisions. 
This psychosis persists to the point where some 
government offi~ials decide what is good for the 
people to know" 
2 
This statement represents the opiniom of an entire 
committee and is based on the results of more than a year's 
investigation of the availability of information from fed-
eral agencies" 
On the other hand, another report from another com-
mittee diametrically opposes the report by the Moss Commit-
tee ~ith this brief but unequivocal assertion~ 
f. 
Too much information has been released which is of 
no benefit to the American public but which is of 
tremendous value to our opponentso2 
Still another comment on the problem, while not ex~ 
il 
II 
I! 
,I 
pressing a completely different point of view, is indicative Ji 
of the perplexity of the problemo 
It appears that there has been too much information, 
mis-information, cross.,.,information, an.d non-
information emanating from the Depa~tment of Defense" 3 
1u"s" Congress, House, Committee on Government Op-
erations, Availabilit~ of Information from Federal Depart-
men.ts and Agenciesft 2 th Intermediate Report, 84th Cong-
ress, 2nd-Session ouse Report No" 2947, July 27, 1956 
CWashington, DoCo~ UoS. Government Printing Office, 1956), 
Po 89o 
:i 
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II 2u" S" Congress, House, Qommittee on Appropriations, :1 
Departmen.t of Defense Appropriations for 1956, 84th Cong- - 'I 
ress, lst Session, House Report Noo 49.3, May 5, 1955 (Wash= !1 
ington, DoCo: UoSo Gevemment Pri:nting Office, 1955), p. 27 if 
. 
3uos,. Congress, House, Commi.ttee on Appropriations, 11
1 
Department of Defense Appropriations for 1954, 83rd Congress, 'I 
1st Session, .House Report Noo 680·, June 27, 1953 (Washington, 
DoCo: UoSo Government Printing Office, 1953), Po llo 
3 
Conceivably, all the comments could be right if 
judged by the specific incidents which comprise their sep= 
arate frames of reference. However, !!! cannot be right 
when the entire problem is consideredo The irony of the 
last comment is that it was written a decade agp--and the 
conflict co~tinueso 
It seem~ then, that the age~old thorn in the three 
sides (Executive, Judicial, and'Legislative) of our demo= 
cratic government is the continuing conflict of opinion as 
to what constitutes a balanced iDformation policyo 
When the pain becomes acute--due to Press ar public 
clamor=-the government body begins to writhe. Miraculously, 
'~eipertstv frmn every w~lk of life suddenly appear. Each is 
apparently equipped, trained, and-capable of easing the 
pain. 
Some prescribe an emetic, believing that the throb 
of the conflict will disappear if there is a sudden out-
pouring of the "poison" ~ssumed to have been built up as a 
result of ~thholding information. Others, equally learned, 
take the opposite or paragoric view. All examine the thorn 
and have many meetings concerning the best method of treat-
mento 
Unfortunately, few, if any, view the thorn as a 
necessary prod-=the pr9verbial "poke in the ribs" "'""'designed 
4 
to keep both the government and the people alerto 
What then is the answer to the age=old problem? 
To pursue the analogy for a moment more, what is required 
is tne achievement of a balance so that the thorn remains 
just a prod--not a lethal thrust to the heart of the gov-
ernment bodyo 
This balance that must be achieved is the balance 
between the right of the people to information and facts 
that are essential to a government by the consent of the 
governed (The Right to Know), and the necessity of the gov-
ernment to withhold certain information in the interests of 
national security (The Need to Kn~)D 
In other words, a balancing of The Right to Know Y!o 
The Need to Know--a delicate balance that must be achieved 
if we are to retain our democratic system of governmento 
·I 
GHAPTER I 
THE PROBLEM AND THE PRESS 
The Area to be Analyzed 
The area to be analyzed in this thesis is one of 
the most important, pervading, and current themes ~f today. 
The problems of censorship in a free society, particularly 
in light of the nature of the insidious Communist threat, 
require a delicate and contimual balancing of the necessity 
for our.government to withhold certaiB information Which 
would, if released, be detrimental to our national inter~ 
ests and/or defense, and the right of the public to know 
those facts that are essential to government by the in-
fo:rmed consen.t of the people. As is true of many of the 
most important questions of our time, there is no formula, 
no pat answer, and no "standard operating proceduren for 
this matter, but there is the necessity for striking a 
balance in the field of government information practiceso 
Those individuals responsible for authorizing the release 
of information must make "o •• an estimate ••. as to 
whether it is of greater value to our effort or to the 
6 
opposition, the enemy."1 In addition, these individuals 
"· •• must make every effort to provide the people with 
the raw factual material and the interpretive info~ation 
that is the basis of democratic public opinion formula-
tion."2 
In a democratic society such as ours where the 
ultimate decisions are dependent upon the will of the peo= 
ple, or as stated in our Declaration of Independence, 
"Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just 
Powers from the Con.sent of the Governed," there ~ be a 
mean.s for the p¢ople to get adequate information about 
events and conditions. This information must be presented 
accurately, fully, and with as little bias as possible. A 
free government must have an informed and in.telligent popu-
lace and the information that they receive must be true in-
formation, so that the public opinion resulting from the 
information disseminated by the mass media will, indeed, be 
public opinion, and not the opinion that any particular 
group or individual desires the public to have. 
1oscar Morgenstern, The Question of National Defense 
I 
II 
II 
II 
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'I 
I 
. I 2Bernard Rubin, Public Relations and the Empire I 
(New York: Random House, 1959), p. 230o 
State (New Brunswick, N.J .. : Rutgers university Press, 1958), 11 
p. 9. - 11 
7 
The public relations significance of this topic is 
manifoldo As Stanley Kelley, Jro said, "The activities of 
the public relatioas man have become a significant iRflu~ 
ence in processes crucial to democratic government." The 
' 0 • 
public relations man, whether 'his official title be Infor-
mation Officer, Executive Vice-President, Assistant Secre-
tary for Public Affairs, or Press Secretary, is concerned 
with interpreting public opinion. He must be cognizaat of 
the moods and attitudes of the many publics of his employer, 
whether a large corporation, small business, or government 
agency. The public relations officer, calliBg on his knowl~ 
edge of the communicatioas media and social sciences, is 
very often in a position to advise ~ information will be 
disseminated to the public and what will not, hence exert-
ing a tremendous influence at this point. As Edward Bernays 
has said, although the people are sovereign in a democracy, 
they require guidance==the kind of gUidance that the speci-
alist in the use of the channels of communication can pro-
vide. The very best summation of the public relations sig-
nificance of this thesis is found in an article by G~orge A. 
Warmer. He said, 
Given one world with the western tradition that all 
people have a right to facts and another world where 
propaganda is used for pre-determined government 
ends aad we find ourselves in a titanic struggle be-
tween two opposite concepts of communication. In our 
II 
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world we are committed to the belief that time for 
discussion should be takea to expose falsehood and 
fallacies. We would not avert evil by censorship 
but rather by freedom of expressioa. From this 
point of view, communicators occupy as important a 
position in a free society as any other group. If 
they perform responsibly, if they see themselves 
as the oaes who must disseminate truth convincingly 
and~oroughly, they may well contribute more to 
western civilization and culture in this ti~e of 
severe crisis than any other group.3 
The Role of tbe Pre·ss and 
Freedom of the Press 
8 
"Public opinion is formed by news. Successful 
democracy depends upon _its accuracy. Whenever this princi-
ple is ab~sed, the people cease to govern and become ruled 
~y those who choose to transgress it."4 The American people 
have traditionally depended on the aewspaper~ to bring them 
the news, and although radio and television have added ef-
fective new means of informing people, the newspaper con-
tinues to be indispensable in the preservation of our free 
society. "A newspaper is a public trust~e. It is the 
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II ~~~J 4Lynde M. Walter, Editorial in the Daily Eveninf 
Transcript, July 24, 1830, reprinted in the Boston Even ng 11
1 Transcript, April 30, 1941. 1 
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guardian of the peoples rights. It is a public institution 
which must operate from motives higher than mere gain. It 
is both the watchdog and the promoter of honest and effi-
cient government."5 Thomas Jefferson's position in regard 
to a free press was stated in a letter to Edward Carrington, 
written on January 16, 1787: 
The people are the only censors of their governors: 
and even their errors will tend to keep tnese to 
the true principles of their institution. To pun-
ish these errors too severely would be to suppress 
the only safeguard of the public liberty. The way 
to prevent these irregular interpositions of the 
people is to give them full information of their 
affairs through the channel of the public papers, 
and to contrive that those papers should penetrate 
the whole mass of the people. The basis of our 
governments being the opinion of the people, the 
very first objective should be to keep that right; 
and were it left to me to decide whether we should 
have a government without newspapers or newspapers 
without a government, I should not hesitate a mo-
ment to prefer the latter. But I should mean that 
every man should receive those papers and be cap-
able of reading them.6 
There is no longer much question as to the indis-
pensability of mass communication to democratic government, 
for it is only through the mass media that the people ca~ 
gain enough knowledge of events and conditions to be well 
6Tbomas Jefferson as quoted in Frank Thayer, Le,al 
Control of the Press (Brooklyn: The Foundation Press,nc., 
1962), pp. 23-24. 
10 
enough informed, hence capable of making intelligent deci-
sions. The mass media includes the printed media of news-
papers, magazines, and books, and the electronic media of 
radio and television. The oldest, tried and true medium, 
and the medium upon which the major burden of responsibil-
ity falls, is the newspaper. Ref~rring once again to Jef-
ferson, he said "Where the press is free, an4 every man 
able to read, all is safe!' 
The press is in an extremely privileged position in 
our society in that no governmental coBtrol is exercised 
over it. True, the press is subject to the laws of libel, 
copyright, and the like, and the Post Office Department 
sometimes threatens withdrawal of second-class mailing 
privileges, but basically, the press is free-=as contrasted 
to the very strong governmental control exercised over some 
of the other business enterprises in our nation, like 
Standard Oil Company, U.S. Steel, General Motors, E.I. 
du Pont de Nemours and Company, and so on. This privileged 
position of the press is no mere accident or oversight as 
is eviden.ced by words like these: 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establish= 
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of 
the press; •.. 7 
7Article I (First Amendment); The Constitution of 
the United States of America. 
and, more specifically: 
The liberty of the press i~ essential to the secur-
ity of free?am in a stqte: it ought ~ot, therefore, 
to be restrain.ed1'in this commonwealth.~ 
11 
The press is in this p~ivileged position because 
the 1coloaists knew the struggles of the c~on people 'of 
Englaad for a free press and sqff~red the~selves uader the 
.. 
oppressive measures of the English coloni'l governors. The 
freedom of the press was hard ~arned by the colonists anq 
not taken lightly. In expressing this vi~w, Jefferson 
s~id, "Our liberty det>ex:ads :on the .. ~dom o:f the- pres·s 
! 
and that cannot be limited without be1-,ng lost." In addi~~ 
I ' I 
t~on, the press has the res~onsibility :;to remain free in 
order to perform its.porrelative duty of·gatherin.g ~ad i~= 
! I 
parting informatica balamced against its guaranteep freedom 
of ·expression. The press has been ~alled the "fourth b,ranch 
of government" by more than one sch?lar, and indeed, I feel 
that it is just that. As is, commonly kn.own, the United 
States Governme_nt is fo1;1nded~on the "coDstitutiomal trin= 
ity" of the Legislative, Execp.tive, and Jud.ici~ry depart= 
ments. .A.n.d~ "as one man, the American nation seems to re-
gard it ~s fixed for all time that the checks an.d palances"9 
I 1~ 
8Part I, Articie 16, Constitution of the Common= 
wealth of Massachusetts. 
9Herbert Brucker, Freedom of Information (~ew York: 
The Ma9millan Company, 1949), p. to. ' · 
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12 
among these three branch'e·s. of~ :the govermment ~re. all··there 
is to our government. 
But are they? How can one legislate, or execute, 
or.judge, if one does not know what is going. on? 
How indeed can the people choose their represen-
tatives in government without a bedrock of infor-
mation on which to base their votes? In sum, 
upon what meat doth this our democracy feed? It 
feeds upon facts brought into the minds of its 
citizens by the press, the radio, and the supple-
mentary media of information. This information 
system of our democracy constitutes a little 
recognized but indispensable fourth branch of the 
United States government. • • . Adequate informa-
tion provides the only environment in which demo-
cratic government can live. Without information, 
Congress, President, and courts cannot function.lO 
As a fourth branch of government the press must act as a 
check on the government just as surely as the Congress 
acts as a check on the Executive and the Judicial on the 
Legislative. The responsibility of a free press to check 
on government was well stated by Thomas Erskine, an Eng-
lishman defending Thomas Paine in a British court, about 
1785. He said, 
In this manner power has reasoned in every age; 
government, in its own estimation, has been at 
all times a system of perfection; but a free 
press has examined and detected its errors, and 
the people have from time to time reformed them. 
This freedom has alone made our Government1what it is; this freedom alone can preserve it. 1 
10Ibid., p. 10. 
-11Quoted in Frank L. Mott and R.D. Casey, Interpre-
tations of Journalism (New York: F.S. Crofts and Company, 
1937)' p. 18. 
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13 
Thus we see that the press is in its privileged position 
for many reasons. Freedom of the press !! ~ a right 
given exclusively to thewriter or publisher, but rather 
it is a right that belongs to and protects the peopte from 
abuses by the government. It may not always be the press 
that initiates these corrections of government, for a 
congressman, judge, or any interested citizen has the 
right to be heard. However, it is through the press and 
the mass media that the facts become known. Without the 
press to disseminate the facts, it would be very difficult, 
if not impossible, to enforce any correction. Consider the 
recent unprecedented display of intelligence data, includ-
ing high and low level photographs of Cuban bases, ports, 
and fields that was exhibited over nation wide television 
coverage, and emanated from the State Departmeat auditor-
ium. Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara, under direct 
orders from the President, appeared before the nation to 
answer congressional critics who contended that an offen= 
sive threat (Soviet) still exists in Cuba. Whether or not 
he proved his point still remains to be seen. The fact 
that this was aired publicly was due, in great part, to 
the coverage given the charges, made by Senator Kenneth B. 
~~~~ing (R=N.Y.) and other congressional members, in the 
press. Indeed, the press, through numerous editorials and 
14 
columnists, contributed to the clamor for information on 
this subject of vital importance to every American. This 
is the fourth branch in action. There must continue to be 
a suspicious curiosity and skepticism about all things, 
present in the press--for without this investigation in-
clination, the press could not fulfill its obligations to 
our free society--it could not serve as our check on gov-
ernment nor bring us the information we require to make 
intelligent decisions and to take an active part in govern-
ing. This then would be a violation of the sacred trust 
placed in the press, which is the only private institution 
specifically mentioned in the Bill of Rights, and it would 
be a threat to the people's right to know, which, as de-
fined by Kent C~oper, means that "the citizen is entitled 
to have access to news, fully and accurately prese~ted."12 
Mrr Cooper, in his book, The Right to Know, further states 
that "there cannot be political freedom in o~e country, or 
in the world, without respect for the wright to know.•n13 
In another book with almost the identical title, Harold L. 
) 
Cross emphasizes that "Freedom of information is the very 
12Kent Cooper,_ The Rightlto Know (New York: Farrar, 
Strauss and Cudahy, 195.6), p. xi!. 
13Ibid., p. xiii. 
15 
'foundation for all those freedoms that the First Amendment 
I 
II 
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14 :1 of our Constitution was intended to guarantee." Wilbur I' 
Schramm, in his outstanding book Responsibilitx in Mass Com~ I 
II I~ munications, asks, "What is the kind of freedom we are try-
. 1 
ing to keep?" 5 and then very succinctly answers the query 
with, "When you look carefully at it, it breaks down into 
three parts: 
Freedom ~.know--the right to get the information 
we need in order to organize our lives and take an intelli-
gent part in governing. 
Freedom ~ tell--the right to transmit information 
freely and to take a public stand on an issue and argue for 
it. 
Freedom ~ find ~--the right of access by com-
municating media to sources of-information which needs to 
be told and known."16 
All of these freedoms are protected by our free 
press, and although the press itself is somewhat touchy 
14Harold L. Cross, The People's Ri~ht to Know (New York: Columbia University Press, 195 ), preface. 
1~ilbur Schramm, Resionsibility in Mass Communica-) 
tions (New York: Harper and ow, PubliShers, Inc., 1957), 
p. 106. 
16Ibid., p. 107. 
16 
about criticism, it does, in the long run, what our found-
ing fathers hoped it would. "The Fourth Estate, the free 
press, the prying press--they are all one and the same 
thing--is like the rain that soaks you to the skin. The 
soaking may annoy you, but without rain you could not live. 
Without a press free to pry, democracy cannot live.n17 
Dealing With the Menace 
In the last few decades there has been a marked in-
,I 
I' 
II I, 
II 
I 
1: 
crease in the tendency of government officials (and organiza- 1\ 
·, ·' !i 
tions) to classify information. In addition, there is no J, 
II doubt that an intensification of security measures is in 
evidence nowadays, and the viewpoint of the mass media to-
ward this situation is readily apparent in the following 
quote by James s. Pope, Louisville Times editor: 
Sharp and critical disagreement has been found to 
exist between the country's newspaper editors and 
the office-holders who contrive much of the news. 
How much should the people know? Of course, every 
newspaperman is used to a nominal tussle over news 
that reflects some discredit on~elected or employed 
public officials •.•• That is a conflict as old 
as government and news of government. But the con-
flict has gone beyond that simple ceremonial. Only 
recently have most editors begun to realize that 
these familiar little guerilla skirmishes now are 
part of a broad-scale offensive against freedom of 
information--against the basic principle of the 
17Herbert Brucker, op. cit., p. 48. 
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citizen's right to know, so that he may govern him-
self.l8 
17 
But is there in fact, as Mr Pope says, a broad-scale 
offensive against freedom of information? This is a ques-
tion that must be examined carefully before obediently 
answering in the affirmative. The question is not a new 
one either. Consider this seemingly current query. "Is 
there a sy~tem of censorship conducted by the present ad-
..... 
ministration at Washington for the purpose of suppressing 
vital facts? Is there an organized attempt. to prevent the 
public from learning what is being done?"19 No, the ad-
ministration in question is not the present one, nor were 
the questions prompted by either the U-2 or Cuban affairs. 
' Rather, the self-same questions we ~hear today, were 
asked, in this case, in 1935 about the administration of 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt. 
The government h~s the responsibility to avoid dis-
closure of any information that would be useful to the 
enemy or harmful to the interests of the United States. I 
use the word "enemy" because I feel we are now engaged in 
18James s. Pope, "Problems of Journalism," Address 
to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, 1950. 
19George Michael, Handout (New York: G.P. Putnam's 
Sons, 1935), p. 3. 
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18 
the "supreme crisis of Western civilization"20 and must 
recognize the Communists as our declared enemy, dedicated 
to destroying us and dominating the world. As Admiral 
Arleigh Burke, retired Chief of Naval Operations said in 
his testimony before the Special Preparedness·Subcommittee 
-
of the Committee on Armed Services: 
We are at a pivotal time in history • ~ . we are 
witnes~ing a powerful social order, Communism, 
trying to get control of the whole world. The Com-
munists have already seized control of a large part 
of the world and they ruthlessly maintain that con-
trol once they have seized power ••.• The Com~ 
munists use all elements of power to achieve their 
aims of dominating the world. • • • They use mili= 
tary power, economic power, subversion, propagaada, 
political negotiations, every means possible, in 
their attempts to gain their ends. This has been 
said many times, but it is important for us to 
realize that the Communists have ~emonstrated the 
most complete amalgamation in the use of all forms 
of power in human history.21 
There is no peace in the world today, according to both our 
definition of the word and the Communist definition, the 
latter being the "time when there will no l;.onger be any op-
position to the paramount aim of bringing the entire world 
II 
II 
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if 
under Communism. n 22 An interesting analogy of the difference \1 
I 
20senator Thomas J. Dodd of Connecticut. 
21u.s. Senate, Military Cold War Education and Speech 
Review Policies (Washington, b:C.: U.S. Government Printing 
office, 1962), pp. 8-9. 
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19 
in points of view between the Communist and the Free World 
outlook on peace was made by Senator Strom Thurmond wheR 
he observed that, 
Traditionally, the governments of non=Communist 
nation-states "shift-gears" when the line between 
peace and war is prossed. The Communists do not 
recognize any difference of status or operational 
methods between peace and war, and conduct them-
selves partially within the framework of both. By 
these means they paralyze nation-states by induc-
ing them to remain in the traditional process of 
"shiftiRg gears." The center of the shift is. 
necessarily "neutral." The consequence in non-
Communist nations is extensive confusion.23 
Due to the nature of the insidious Communist 
threat, the government's responsibility to prevent the 
unauthorized disclosure of official iaformation, particu-
larly in the field of military and diplomatic affairs, 
which would be detrimental to the interests of the Free 
World and this Nation, has increased tremendously. As the 
government's responsibility has increased, so too has the 
responsibility of the press increased==not to try to break 
the secrecy, but to carefully and attentively question the 
administration of secret operations in an effort to prevent 
governmental "securecy"24 and a restriction of the free 
23u.s. Senate, Military Cold War Education and 
Speech Review Policies, op. cit., p. 49. 
2~y own term, derived from security and secrecy. 
Intended meaning: the misuse of secrecy (or classifica-
tion) in the supposed interests of national security. 
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flow of information to the people. Although there seems to 
be an inherent contradiction between the two requirements, 
nevertheless there is a need for more official secrecy and 
a need for more public information. Some proposals were 
made by Secre.tary of Defense McNamara at a news conference 
in Washington, D.C., on May 26, 1961, to aid members of the 
Defense Department in reconciling and fulfilling the two 
. .. 
requirements. The following are extracts from the Secre-
tary I S remarkS: 
Im order to provide further guidance for those of 
us-, all of us, both military and civilian officials 
alike, who must deal with this problem, I suggested 
four principles to help the members of the Depart-
~ent to meet both these requirements. The applica-
t~on of these principles, although they might re-
strict the flow of lroperly classified information 
to some extent, wou d encourage more open, more 
responsible discussion of the pros and cons of 
national defense policies and practices. The prin-
ciples are: (1) In a democratic society the public must be 
kept informed of the major issues in national de-
fense policy, because the most important issues 
are likely to be the most difficult ones; the 
arguments on both sides must be made clear so 
that there can be a consensus of coincidence:in 
the ultimate decision. We are under a special 
obligation to disclose mistakes and ineffective 
administrative operations. 
The public has at least as much right to 
bad news as to good news. (2) It is essential to avoid disclosures of in-
formation that can be of national assistance to 
our potential enemies, and therefore weaken our 
defense position. It is equally important to 
avoid overclassification; when in doubt, under-
classify. In no event should overciassification 
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be used to avoid ~ublic discussion of contro-
versial matters.25 
21 
These words of Secretary McNamara seem to be in answer to 
the question posed earlier: "Is there a broad-scale of-
' 
fensive against freedom of information?" While there is 
no clear cut yes or no involved, it raises anew another 
question that was posed by Aristotle centuries ago: "The 
environment,is complex and man's political capacity is 
simple. Can a bridge be built between them?" As is evi-
denced by our democratic form of government, a bridge can 
indeed be built to span the canyon of ignorance, or lack 
of informatica, between the people and the government. 
There must be a willingness on the part of government of-
ficials and agencies to release information that the pub-
lic has a right to know and which would not endanger na-
tional security. In addition, the press must continue to 
ferret out and publicize the actions of the government, 
thus bringing to the people the information that reduces 
the canyon of ignorance to a mere valley, and enables the 
citizen to be informed so that he is capable of making 
inteLligent and, hop~fully, correct decisions. 
25secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara as 
quoted in U.S. Senate, The New Drive Against the Anti-
Communist Program (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1961), p. 30. Emphasis mine. 
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The Justification and Need for Government 
Public Relations 
22 
Another problem that has come to light recently is 
the difficulty of t~e press (and all the mass media) to ade-
quately cover the news of government due to the increase in 
the size of the establishment, and the complexities of gov-
ernment. In days gone by, news of government was a compar-
atively simple matter of reporting political campaigns and 
speeches, personalities, trust-QQSting, and so on. It was 
an entirely different problem than that of reporting world 
affairs, space flights, atomic energy, photo~reconnaissance, 
tax reductions and reforms, and other complex subject mat-
ter. Interpreting the 90mplexities 9f government requ~res 
highly trained specialists, in many cases beyond the pay-
roll capabilities of the newspapers. Nevertheless, a great 
deal of progress has been made by the media in government 
reporting during the past decade. 
Because the Reople's right to know is at a maximum 
when dealing with the government, and their ability to know 
is at a minimum, the public relations man in governmeat as-
sumes a significant role in aiding the press to obtain in-
formation,. Although there are many that will argue there 
is no place for public relations in the government because 
of the "propaganda" aspect or connotation associated with 
it, it is well to remember that propaganda itself is 
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neutral-ait can be good or bad. 
There are also some specific legal restrictions 
which tend to confuse the issue and practice of public rela-
tions by the government. In 1913 an act of Congress was 
passed which forbid the spending of money for "publicity ex-
perts"--this, if enforced, could completely paralyze all 
government information practices including, if interpreted 
literally, the United States Information Agency (USIA). 
The result would be a plunge into the canyon of ignorance. 
l 
The justification for government public relations 
rests on the premise that a democratic government is obliged 
to report to its citizens, and, effective administration re-
quires citizen participation and voter support. 26 As 
Stanley Kelley observed: 
Any system of government, autocratic or demo-
cratic, owes its life to some kind of support in 
public opinion. Our own system not only accommo-
dates itself to this opinion but alsp gives to the 
mass of citizens, ... instruments to control the 
policies and personnel of government. It is into 
this fundamental relationship • . • between those 
who seek power and those who bestow authority, 
that the public relations man inserts himself •• 27 
This does not infer that government public relations prac-
titioners should replace the press as the public 9 s 
26stanley Kelley, Jr., Public Relations and Polit-
ical Power (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1956). 
27~., p. 179". 
24 
intelligence service or as the fourth branch of government 
-~rather, ~here is room and a positive need for both. The 
press, by virtue of its privileged position in our society, 
has the responsibility of keeping the people well informed. 
"The news media must be eternally vigilant and aggressive" 
says the Report of the Sigma Delta Chi Committee on Free-
dom of Information. It further advises: 
There is nothing in the constitutional guarantee 
of freedom of the press which assures a newspaper 
the trust and respect of the people with whom it 
must live. Without that trust and respect, freedom 
of the press enters into direct conflict with free-
dom of information. Because the press does not 
manufacture most information, and only reports it, 
the newspaper must have the cooperation of those 
persons in whose custody the information is to be 
found. 
That cooperation, in the main, must be freely 
given. Yet, because of conflicts betwe~n the im~ 
pulses of political self preservation which natur-
ally rule most persons in public life, and the ob-
ligations of the press to print both the good and 
the bad, that cooperation must be assiduously cul-
tivated. This is not to say that a newspaper should 
curry favor of any political regime. But certainly 
it must discharge its functions as _the "fourth 
estate" of government with as much honor, consis-
tency, and competence as are necessary to establish 
and maintain the complete respect of both public 
officials and the public.28 
Although I have said previously that there is no 
peace in the world today, I sincerely hope that the reader 
2~"Report of SiSJ!la Delta Chi Committee on Freedom 
of Information," Quill (January, 1_953). 
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is not expecting to find in the conclusion, the advocacy of 
another organization similar to either the World War I Com-
mittee on Public Information or the World War II Office of 
War Information. While these agencies were, I believe, a 
necessity at the time, there is an irreconcilable conflict 
present when censorship is imposed upon the people. The 
conflict exists between the newspapers, whose business it 
is to dig continually for the news, and the government, who 
tries to keep quiet what it is doing. This situation, for-
tunately, does not exist today as it did then. A famous 
editorial in the New York Herald Tribune (October 9, 1941) 
summed up tpe feelings of the people toward the increasing 
number of government agencies (prior to the war) dealing 
in one way or another with information. This editorial, 
headed, "Here's Where We Get OFF," said, · 
Her~, obviously, is the answer. to the prayers 
of a bewildered people. The Office of Facts and 
Figures, or OFF, will coordinate the Office of 
the Coordinator of Information (or OCI), report on 
the Office of Government Reports, o •• press~agent 
the innumerable Press·Agents of the Individual De-
partments (often called the PAIDS) and will under 
no circumstances do anything whatever that anybody 
else is doing already. o •• 
OFF is just going to superimpose its own "well 
organized-facts" upon the splendid confusion, in-
terpret the interpreters, redigest those who now 
digest the digesters, explain what those who ex-
plain what the explainers of the explanations mean, 
and coordinate the coordinators of those appointed 
to coordinate the coordinations of the coo.rdinated. 
Before this example of the sublime administrative 
genius which now rules in Washington, the mind can 
only reel with admiration. . • • When tpe Office of 
Utter Confusion and Hysteria (to be referred to as 
OUCH) has finally been created, then the capstone 
will have been set upon the pyramid and we can all 
die happy, strangled in the very best r~d tape.29 
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Both the press and the government have made sig-
nificant advances in obtaining and releasing information 
that is not detrimental to the public interest. The gov-
ernment, aided by professional public relations personnel, 
has shown itself to be more responsive to p~blic opinion 
while the press, in spite of ever increasing governmental 
complexity, has succeeded in furthering the public's un-
derstanding by better reporting, explaining, interpreti~g, 
and clarifying of the current issues of the day. 
The Need for a Balance 
As is true in mariy matters of public policy, a 
balance is required. "In arriving at such a point of 
equilibrium in the field of government information prac-
tices, it is important to consider not only the claims that 
need to be weighed in the balance, such as the need to stim-
ulate the maximum flow of information to the community and 
to prevent the disclosure of state secrets to a national 
29Editorial in the New York Herald Tribune, October 
9, 1941, p. 22. 
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adversary, but also the degree to which each of these con-
flicting interests is effectively represented in the pro-
cess of pressure and counterpressure through which public 
policy in a democracy is so largely hammered out."30 
There is no task more difficult, facing our demo-
cratic government and the free press, than that of contain-
ing pressures toward excessive publicity without encourag-
ing practices of "securecy" that would restrict the free 
flow of information about public affairs which is neces-
sary to a government that derives its just powers from the 
consent of the governed. 
3
°Francis E. Rourke, "How Much Should The Govern-
ment Tell?" Saturday Review, Volume 44, Nc;>. 19 (May 13, 
1961), p. 31. 
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The Right to Know vs. The Need to Know 
No single factor is more important to the strength 
of our democracy than the free flow of accurate in~ 
formation about the government's operations. The. 
citizen in a democracy must know what his govern-
ment is doing, or he will lack the soundest basis 
for judging. . • .1 . 
The "right" to have such an uninterrupted free flow 
of information so that the citizen will indeed have a sound 
basis for judging, is the "right to know." Any "efforts to 
hobbl~ th~ news for publication through executive privilege, 
overemphasis on classified information and various legis-
lative proposals affecting the press may be a violation of 
the right to know."2 There is little disagreement that the 
government pas the obligation to inform the public--nor can 
one find many dissenters ~o the axiom that the people have 
a right to know. In addition, it is acknowledged that the 
1clark R. Mollenhoff, Washington Cover-Up (New York: 
Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1962), p. 9. 
2Frank Thayer, Legal Control of the Press (Brooklyn: 
The Foundation Press, Inc., 1962), p. v. 
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press, the public, and the Congress must ascertain that 
freedom of information is guaranteed, so that our democracy 
will continue to thrive. How this is to be guaranteed 
poses a question that has been raised ever since this coun-
try was founded. The basic problem that exists is the cen-
sorship of information, in the true interest of national 
security, to insure against the release of information 
which would be useful to the enemy or harmful to the inter-
ests of the United States. 
Most of the facts on which the American people must 
base a sound judgment are in the possession of the Govern-
ment, and the Government is well aware of this fact. "Dur-
ing the 1960 Presidential campaign, President Kennedy made 
a most forthright declaration on the responsibility of the 
President to keep the citizens fully informed so that democ-
racy would flo'!-lrish." 3 He said, 
An info~ed citizenry is the basis of representative 
government. Democracy--as we know it--cannot exist 
unless·the American people are equipped with th~ in-
formation which is necessary if they are to make the 
informed political choices on which the proper func-
tioning of the democracy depends. An informed people 
--able to examine, and when necessary, to criticize, 
its government--is the only guarantee of responsible 
democracy.4 
3c1ark R. Mollenhoff, 
4 IE!£.' p. 178. 
.... op._.-......c....,i-.t 0) pp. 17 7 -17 8 . 
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Still during the campaign, President Kennedy said further, 
that, 
The President~-who himself bears much of the re-
sponsibility for the preservation of American de~ 
mocracy--has the affirmative duty to see that the 
American people are kept fully informed. It is 
true that in today's world of peril some Govern-
ment information must be kept secret--information 
whose publication would endanger the security of 
national security--the people of the United States 
are entitled to the fullest possible information 
about their Government--and the President must see 
that they receive it.5 ' • 
This pronouncement was in line with the platform of the 
Democratic party on "Freedom of Information." That plat-
form said, 
We reject the Republican co~tention that the work-
ings of government are the special private pre-
serve of the Executive. The massive wall of 
secrecy erected between the Executive branch and 
the Congress as well as the citizen must be torn 
down. Information must flow freely, save in those 
ar~as in which the national security is involved.6 
After the campaign was over and John F. Kennedy became our 
thirty-fifth President, in his State of the Union address 
o~ January 30, 1961 he said, 
For my part, I shall withhold from neither the Con-
gress nor the people any fact or report, past, pres-
ent, or future, which is necessary for an informed 
31 
judgment of our conduct or hazards. 7 
The Chief Executive and the Democratic party platform (o~ 
at least one plank of it) are quoted here to point out 
that there is no u~awareness of the problem in Washington 
--the problem being the great debate over freedom of in-
formation. Essentially, this becomes a question of how 
open ~an we allow our society and government to be in this 
era 8f supreme conflict for world supremacy, between Com-
munism and the Free World. It is not enough to cite obvi-
ous examples of the necessity for cl~ssification--nor is it 
. 
intelligeat to state that the government should release all 
information. What is required is a balancing of the "right 
to know" vs. the "need. to know"--a delicate balance that 
must be achieved if we are to retain our .democratic system 
of government. 
The right to know has been discussed previously, 
and in the past few years has become a fairly common ex-
pression meaning simply that the people have a right to in-
formation--or it can be stated conversely that the govern-
ment has an obligation to fulfill the people's right to 
know. This "rig~t" is "an attribute of the liberty guar-
an teed . . • by the Bill of Rights, but it is not automatic, 
32 
and the campaign for freedom of information~ust be tire-
le$sly waged •••• "8 ,. 
The need to know is !!,2!, as many might imagine at 
first glance, the antithesis of the right to know. Rather, 
it is somewhat of a modification of the right to know and 
is directly concerned with the other obligation of the 
government--that of safeguarding our national security by 
~ releasing information which will materially aid an 
enemy. As such, the need to know is an expression usually 
connected with the mil~tary and other governmental agencies 
and carries the connotation of releasing information only 
to those who have a need for such information in order to 
satisfactorily perform their particular jobs or duties. 
As stated in an official government publication, "Knowledge 
or possession of classified defense information shall be 
permitted only to persons whose official duties require 
such access .• 0 0 
The inherent difficulty of the right to know con-
cept lies in the fact that when the scales are tipped in 
8Remarks by C. Herschel Schooley, Director of In-
formation, Department of Defense to the Ame.~ican Political 
Science Association Convention Panel on Government Informa-
tion Problems, Hotel Henry·Hudson, New York, September 7, 
1957. (Mimeographed.) 
9Air Force Regulation 205-1, Safeguarding Military 
Information (Washington, D.C.~ Department of the Air Force, 
lO June 1960), p. 22. 
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the direction of a freer flow of information, our adver-
saries take advantage of everything that we divulge openly 
or make publicly available. Allen W. Dulles, former di~ 
rector of the Central Intelligence Agency, while admittedly 
prejudiced in this direction, said, "I feel that we hand 
out too many of our secrets, particularly in the field of 
military hardware and weaponry, and that we often fail to 
make the vital distinction between the type of things that 
should be secret and those which, by their nature, are not 
and cannot be kept secret."10 
The difficulty inherent in the need to know con-
:ept is, eventually, the lack of information. This comes 
about gradually, often insidiously, and, in the opinion of 
one scholar familiar with the problem of freedom of infor-
mation, "· •• is the key to the fundamental evil of cen-
sorship; for, whether we like it or not, military censorship 
brings political censorship in its train. To expect to 
have the essential good of military censorship without the 
evil of political censorship is like expecting to have a 
garden without weeds." 11 
The official government documents that promulgate 
the general principles of security of information recognize 
10Allen W. Dulles, 
Christian Science Monitor, 
llHerbert Brucker, 
p. 186 0 
1'\•• 
"Dulles Discusses Secrecy," The 
February 19, 1963, p. 22. 
Freedom of Information, op. cit., 
34 
that the people have a fundamental right to information 
regarding the size and capabilities of its military forces, 
and are cognizant of the fact that the military services 
depend upon and exist only by virtue of the confidence and 
support of the American public. "It is the Air Force's 
policy to keep the public informed on military activities, 
provided information so released is not detrimental to 
United States security."12 To carry this policy up the 
chain of command, "The Department of Defense recognizes 
the right of the public to complete information and the im-
portant function of the media in presenting the facts to the 
public. Its policy is to keep our people fully informed 
within the limits permitted by security."13 
Any censorship, regardless of form, is always a 
strain on the mutual confidence, trust, and good will be-
tween the Government and the people, but it is recognized 
{by some, at least) as a necessary evil in spite of the 
fact that it is an impingement upon the right to know. An 
Air Force M~nual warns against undue withholding or sup-
, 
pression of information by saying, "The press will always 
find a way to disclose to the public, information of a 
12Air Force Regulation 190-12, Information Services 
--Release of Information (Washington, D.C.: Department of 
the Air Force, 18 December 1956), p. 1. 
13Air Force Manual 190-5, Field Press Censorship 
(Washington, D.C.: Department of the Air Force, 13 August 
1954), p. 3. 
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non-security nature which the military tries to suppress. 
And, when the information is published, the fact that sup-
pression was attempted magnifies the original error out of 
all proportion."14 If we accept the two premises that 
(1) to publish·information is to give it directly to the 
enemy, and (2) there are certain facts which must, in the· 
interests of national security, be withheld, then we must 
conclude that a uniform system of classifying official in-
formation is a definite requirement. However, this system 
must not upset the delicate balance between the right to 
know and the need to know~-a balance that is the very· es-
sence of democracy. 
Executive Privilege 
The need for some means of governmental classifi-
cation in the interests of defense and security has, of 
course, long been recognized. It was none other than 
George Washington who established the right of the Chief 
Executive to withhold even from the Senate, public papers, 
the disclosure of which he felt would not be in the national 
interest. Setting the precendent for the Government's 
36 
concern about the flow of military information, Washington 
is said to have written to the President of the Congress 
in 1777 and said, 
It is much to be wished that our printers were 
more discreet in many of their publications. We 
see almost in every paper • o o accounts trans-
mitted to the enemy of an injurious nature. If 
some hint or caution could be given them on the 
subject, it might be of material service.l5 
The historic conflict of freedom of information 
versus national security, or of the right to know vs. the 
., 
need to know, has reached a new level of intensity in the 
past decade. This is a direct result of the growth of both 
the size and complexity of government coupled with the 
uneasy tension brought upon us by the nation whose leader 
h~s promised to bury us. 
On September 25, 1961, President Harry S. Truman 
issued Executive Order 10290 giving all the agencies of the 
Federal Government {Executive branch) authority to classify 
information which those officials might deem important to 
national security. This did, in effect, give the head of 
every governmental agency authority to act as his own 
censor. Truman said to department heads that the order 
"must not be used to cover up mistakes by any official or 
15
"Salinger Firmly Denies Soviet Flights Over U.S.," 
Washington Star, December 5, 1962. 
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employee of the Government." However, the way the Order 
was written, its use for these very purposes was inevit~ 
able. President Truman's order was strongly, if not ve~ 
hemently opposed by the press, as witnessed by such de-
nouncements as James S. Pope's, in a report to the Ameri~ 
can Society of Newspaper Editors; His committee found, 
"Appalling evidence that the guiding credo in Washington 
is that it is dangerous and unwise to let information leak 
0 16 out in any unprocessed form~" 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower modified Truman's 
order when he issued a new Executive Order (number 10501), 
effective December 15, 1953. This directive limited the 
authority to classify to selected Executive agencies. The 
Departments of State, Defense, Treasury, Justi~e, and Com-
merce, the Atomic E~ergy Commis'sion (AEC) , and the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) retained full authority to 
classify, while in seventeen other agencies, classifica-
tion may be affixed by the head of the agency alone. An 
additional twenty-eight agencies (ranging from the Battle 
Monuments Commission to the Veterans Education Appeal Board) 
,are forbidden to classify on the grounds of national defense 
16nu.s. Press Is Free to Print the News but Too 
Often Is Not Free to. Gather It," Quill, Volume 39 (July, 1951) ;: 
P• 9 o II 
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or security. This Order was almost as violently criticized 
by the press as was the preceding one, and the President 
was urged by many news groups and individuals to rescind it. 
However, President Eisenhower insistted that "The Order rep-
resents the minimum protection necessary to the defense 
interests of the nation,"17 and it is (Executive Order 
10501), in fact, the basis for our present classification 
system. 
The Classification System 
There seems to be a general impression in the minds 
of many people that the only decision required of a govern-
ment official, be he military or civilian, when deciding 
on the appropriate security classification to be affixed to 
official information which requires safeguarding in the 
interests of the United States, is which "stamp" to pick up 
and use. This is hardly the case. "The use of a defense 
classification is authorized only for official information 
I 
which requires protection in the interests of national de-
fense. An individual who assigns or autho~iz~s the assign-
ment of a defense classification to information in 
17President Dwight D. Eisenhower as quoted in 
Scott M. Cutlip and All~n H. Center, Effective Public Rela-
tions (Ne~ Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1958), p. 355. 
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violation of this rule is subject to disciplinary action 
authorized by law or a~inistrative regulations."18 
The need for classification, the authority to 
classify, and the classification categories themselves re-
quir~ a closer examination than the cursory one usually 
given this subject. With reference to the need, Air Force 
Regulation 205-1, the "Bible" for Safeguarding Military 
Information, is specific. It says, 
The inter~sts of national defense require that 
the United States preserve its ability to protect 
itself against all hostile or destructive action. 
This includes protection against covert or overt 
action or espionage, as well as military action. 
It is thus essential that certain official infor-
mation which affects the national defense be pro-
tected uniformly against unauthorized disclosure. 
It does not, however, authorize the withholding of 
information otherwise releasable on the grounds 
that its release might be e~barrassing or might 
tend to reveal administrative error or ineffici-
ency.l9 
This paragraph.is in itself quite cl~ar, particu-
larly in its reference to the suppression of information 
that is ~ official information, or information that would 
~ endanger national security. The specific categories of 
classification set up by the President's Exe~utive Order are 
defined as follows, again in Air Force Regqlation 2Q5-l: 
18Ai~ Force Regulation 20$-1, op. cit., p. 10. 
19Ibid., p. 5. 
Official information which requires protection in 
the interests of national defense will be limited 
to three categories ••• which in descending · 
order of importance shall carry one of the follow-
ing desi2flations: TOP SECRET, SECRET, or CONFI-
,pENTIAL. . 
40 
To further elucidate each category of classified official 
information, Executive Order 10501 defines the TOP SECRET 
category as follows: 
The use of classification TOP SECRET shall be 
authorized, by appropriate authority, only for de-
fense information or material which requires the 
highest degree of protection. The TOP SECRET 
classification shall be applied only to that in-
formation or material the defense asiect of which 
'is paramount, and the unauthorized d sclosure of 
which could result in exceltionally grave damage 
to the Nation such as lead ng to a definite break 
in diplomatic relations affecting the 'defense of 
the United States, an armed attack against the 
United States or its allies, a war, or the compro-
mise of military or defense plans, or intelligence 
operations, or scientific or technological develop-
ments vital to the national defense.2I 
~ The SECRET category i~ defined thus~y: 
The use of the classification SECRET shall be au-· 
thorized, by appropriate authority, only for de-
fense information or material. the unauthorized 
disclosure of which could result in serious damage 
to the Nation, such as by jeopardizing the ~nter­
national relations of the United States, endanrr-
ing the effectiveness of a\program or policy o 
vital importance to the na·tional defense, or co -
promising important military ~r defense plans, ~ 
20Ibid. 
-
21~. 
scientific or technological developments important 
to natiomai. defense; 'Qr informatio~2r.e~ealing · important intelligence operations. 
and the CONF.IDENTIAL in this manner: 
the use of the·classification CONFIDENTIAL shall 
be authorized, by appropriate authority., only for 
defense information or material the unauthorized 
disclosure of which could be pre~udicial to the 
defense interests of the Nation. 3 
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The authority to classify is spelled out in great 
detail in the regulations, with the primary or governing 
factor being the category of classification. For example, 
the authority for the original assignment of information 
to the Top Secret category is limited to officials who 
have broad responsibility for directing or supervising the 
development or origination of the types of information 
described in the definition of Top Secret matter. In ef-
fect, this authority to classify material Top Secret is 
limited to General Officers (and higher) only. 
" • 0 • 
only the following officials are authorized to assign an 
original classification of TOP SECRET to information: the 
Secretary, Under Secretary, and each Assistant Secretary 
of the AIR FORCE; the Chief of Staff and Vice Chief of 
Staff, USAF; each Deputy Chief of Staff, The Inspector 
General, Comptroller of the Air Force, Assistant Chief of 
Staff, Guided Missiles, and Assistant Chief of Staff, 
22!2!£., P· 6. 
23~., p. 7. 
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Intelligence, Headquarters, USAF; and commanders of major 
air commands. 1124 
As the classification category becomes. lower, the 
number of personnel authorized to classify increases. Add 
to this the other military departments and the civilian 
agencies of the government and we find thousands, if not 
tens of thousands of individual officers endowed with the 
authority to classify. Is there any doubt that the opera-
tion called classification is a complex one? I think not. 
It is complex, it is frustrating, it is not readily re-
solved, and it is necessary, I fear, for every responsible 
person knows that there are many security requirements in 
peacetime as well as during a war. I use the word "peace-
time" in lieu of "cold war" only because it connotates the 
opposite of war. However, despite the complexity of our 
security system, we must continue to accept fully the demo-
cratic principle of the public's right to know, compatible 
with genuine security requirements. James Wiggins, one of 
our foremost editors, put it very succinctly when he said, 
Wise censorship by democratic definition ought to 
be a censorship that yields the most security with 
the least interference with the news. The military 
ca~ot have all the security it wishes without de~· 
ilyi:ng to. the people the information they must 
24 Ibid., p. 4. 
-
support for an effective defense. The people, can-
not have all the information they would like to 
have without endangering security.25 
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In our American democracy, the right to know is 
inherent in the people, and the government, having been 
granted the authority to withhold information i~ the pub-
lic interest, bears the burden of proof of the need to 
know. This dees not, in any way, alter its duty or obli-
gation te safeguard information involving security, but 
will, in practice, strengthen the security system. 
A Ray of Light 
~here have been, and will continue to be, many 
differences of opinion on the problem of freedom ef infor-
mation. Just recently, a House subcommittee on government 
information policies concluded that the change of adminis-
trations in Washington had eased the flow of news to a 
certain extent, but not enough. This iacidentally, was 
prior to the October, 1962 Cuban c~isis. Noting that in-
numberable government employees still classified secret a 
tremendous amount of information, ranging from the amount 
25James Wiggins, Freedom or Secrecy (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1956)~ p. 12. 
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of water pumped into hams to data on missile tracking, the 
subcommittee concluded that the problem of secrecy in gov-
ernment is not a partisan one, but stems from the nature of 
bureaucracy as well as from the ever present influeace of 
necessary military secrecy. Sigma Delta Chi, the profes-
sional journalism fraternity, came to very much the same 
conclusion and added that the Democrats, who~so loudly 
criticized the Eisenhower information poli~ies, aow were 
behaving more gently while Republicans who previqusly were 
silent, are now vociferously demanding that the lid be taken 
off classified information. 
Due in great.part, I believe, to the perseverance 
of the Moss Committee (actually the Special Sub-Committee 
on Government Information, Representative John E. Moss, 
Chairman), much more, previously classified information, 
will be released under the new system which now downgrades 
most documents at regular time intervals, unless it is de-
cided that the information must remain classified. If this 
is the case, a complicated procedure of re-classification 
must be initiated. The fastest a document normally may be 
made public under the new rules is three years, unless offi-
cials de~ide sooner that the information no longer is sensi-
tive. 
As is always the case, some examples of government 
secrecy defy any rational explanation. One such case 
45 
involved a well known ~cientist, professor, and scholar who 
. 
wrote a secret report for the government and who, same five 
years later, was refused permission to read it over again 
because he lacked the proper clearance. The gove~ent can 
always expect a lot of help from the media in carrying out 
its responsibility to inform the public of its mistakes--
and mistakes will be made in any operation of such tre-
mendous impact--for stories such as these help to se~l news-
papers. 
The Judgment Factor· 
While I feel that it is the duty and respons-ibility 
of the media to ferret out and publicize such discrepancies, 
this responsibility holds true for the good deeds as well 
as the bad. Precious li~tle, if any, is ever written about 
the soul searching done by individual officers when faced 
with the de~ision of classifying a particular piece of in-
formation. I have been in this position often ~nough to be 
well aware of the fact that the right to know versus the 
need to know is a carefully weighed question, the answer 
to which does not come easily. As has been noted by one 
astute observer of government and government information 
practices, 
In the administration of our written laws and ex-
ecutive directives and printed organizational 
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charts of Government agencies and their functions, 
the judgement factor is all important. • • . In 
the information field, with the complexities, and 
intangibles, it should not be surprising that there 
have been, or will be honest differences of the 
question of release or access to information. • • • -
Yet it is the individual in possession of the infor-
mation who has the official responsibility for a de-
cision. 26 ·· 
It is quite evident, particularly in times like 
these, that a balance must be struck between freedom and 
security. We must find ways of achieving security with 
the minimum sacrifice of our hard won freedoms. As we 
weigh and ba'lance our requirements and make the adaptions· 
we feel are absolutely essential, we must bear in mind 
that our experieace has always shown that free men are 
strong men. Perhaps the crux of the matter was well 
stated when it was written that"· •.• regulations are not 
as important as is the wisdom exerted in their applica-
tion,"27 and"· •• it is one thing to have a theoretically 
sound system and quite another thing to make it operate 
26House of Representatives, Special Subcommittee 
on Government Information of the Committee on Government 
Operations, Re lies from Federal A encies to uestionnaire 
(Washington, D.C.~ U.S. Government r nt ng 0 ce, , 
p. 116 as quoted in Bernard Rubin, "Secrecy, Security, and 
Traditions of Freedom of Information: Several Problem 
- Areas," Toward Social Responsibility in Public Communica-
tions (Boston: Institute for Public Relations Studies, 
Fall, 1962), p. 169. 
27Bernard Rubin, 
-.oP...,;...• ...;;c~i~t • , p. 16 9 • 
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.. 
well in an enormous organization such as the Department of 
Defense."28 
The Conflict Continues 
With the possible exception of the ~ite House it-
self, I think it can be safely stated that the Pentagon is 
the source of more vital news, day in and day out, than 
any other agency of our government. Whether the nation is 
at peace or war, military activity affects the lives of mil-
lions of people in a decisive and intimate ~ay--it affects 
F 
their pocketbooks, their homes, their careers, and their 
future--it does, in fact, insure that there will be a fu-
ture by maintaining the strongest military force in the 
world. It is, in other words, an i~ense center of legiti-
mate news. However, the people responsible for releasing 
this news are constantly faced with the problem of balanc-
ing the Right to Know vs the Need to Know~-t'his dilennna is 
perhaps best described in the following report of the Com-
mittee on classified Information: · 
At the risk of stating a platitude, this country 
is far different from a dictatorship, and the im-
pact of that difference is strong on the problem 
28Report of Committee on Classified Information, 
to Secretary of Defense, November 8, 1956. Charles A. 
Coolidge Chairman, p. 3. 
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of information security. Being a democracy, the 
government cannot cloak its operations in secrecy. 
Adequate information as to its activities must be 
given to its citizens or the foundations of its 
democracy will be eaten away. We find that the 
Department of Defense fully subscribes to these 
principles. On the other hand, our democracy can 
be destroyed in another way, namely, by giving a 
potential enemy such information as will enable 
him to conquer us by war. A balance must be 
struck between these two conflicting necessities. 
In the Department of Defense there are peculiar 
factors which make the striking of the proper bal-
ance difficult. The Department spends roughly 
two-thirds of the national budget. At one time 
or another it directs the lives of millions of 
young men and women. And it is charged with plan-
ning for the survival of the nation in case of 
war. These considerations center public interest 
on its activities and weight the balance in favor 
of maximum disclosure. On the other hand, the 
activities of the Department are of the greatest 
interest to a potential enemy. He can profit from 
a disclosure of its activities to a far greater 
extent than disclosure of the activities of most 
of the other governmental departments. So the · 
other side of the scales is heavily weighted. The 
result is that striking the proper balance is more 
important and more difficult than is the case with 
most of the other departments of the government.29 
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The conflict over our information policy continues. 
One group insists that too much information of value to 
potential enemies is being released, while the other group 
mourns the withholding of information required by the pub-
lic to intelligently meet its responsibility in a democracy. 
49 
In the "pro" group--those for increased security--
it is charged that the damage done to our Nation by public 
information releases, leaks, trade journal stories, speeches, 
etc., greatly exceeds that done by spies and subversives. 
The oppos~ng camp charges that classification (or 
just withholding) is censoring history, blocking scientific 
progress, used as a cover for personal fear of embarrassment., 
preventing government from functioning properly, gagging 
high officials, and is a del~berate attempt to disseminate 
self-serving propaganda designed to garner public support, 
influence legislation, and so on. 
One student of the problem offered a rather simple 
expla~ation--not, however, a solution. He said, 
Conflict over information policy is an inevitable 
by-product of the democratic process. The point 
at which a proper balance is achieved between 
disclosure and secrecy will always be debated by 
groups with conflicting responsibilities and con-
trasting perspectives.30 
It is important to note that there are other dichoto- li 
,, 
" 
mies perhaps as significant as disclosure vis-a-vis secrecy ii 
to be considered in formulating an information policy. What 
might otherwise be considered just a "by-product of the 
democratic process," limited in scope and importance, takes 
30Harry H. Ransom, Government Secrecy and National 
Security: An Analtsis, Serial No. 123, Harvard University 
Defense Policy Sem nar, January 6, 1958, p. 10. 
so 
on much larger dimensions when placed in perspective as a 
part of the continuing struggle between the forces of com-
munism and freedom. These are not normal times. The dan-
ger presented by the Communist offensive should be well 
known to the reader. No responsible American would want 
to give "a potential enemw such information as will en-
able him to conquer us by war." 
The consternation caused by the nature of the in-
sidious Communist threat is illustrated by the innovations 
and improvisations in the structure of the Executive 
branch of our government that began shortly after World 
War II. A major legislative attempt to achieve political--
military coordination and unity of effort was made with 
the enactment of the National Security Council and incorpo-
rated the three military services into a Department of De-
fense. The first effort to strike the proper balance, in 
spite of the peculiar factors that make such an equilibrium 
so difficult, came in October of 1947, when Secretary of 
Defense James Forrestal issued a memorandum, Subject: Pub-
-
lie Relations of the National Military Establishment. 
While this did not create a single public relations office 
it did establish some coordination machinery between the 
services and the parent Department. 
On March 17, 1949, the Office of Public Information 
in the Department of Defense was established. This was a 
I 
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natural outgrowth of unification and was created in response 
to pressure from the press, the public and Congress. 
A great many changes have taken place in what was 
originally called the Office of Public Information (OPI). 
Titles have been changed, new jobs have been created and old 
ones eliminated, personalities have come into the spotlight 
and faded out, and so on. The important changes, however, 
have been made above the old OPI on the Department of De-
fense formal organization chart. 
As things stand now, all the rules, regulations, and 
guidance pertaining to the public affairs of the three ser~ ~ ! 
' q I 
vices are laid down (in the name of the Secretary of Defense) :1 
by a civilian Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs. ~e 
incumbent is Mr. Arthur Sylvester, formerly the Washington 
Bureau Chief of the Newark News. 
Civil-Military Relations 
It is, I believe, quite clear that the military ser-
vices are not free agents in the field of public information. 
Nor do I believe that they should be. This raises the broad 
question of the principal of civilian control over the mili-
tary. I, for one, do not feel that there is any question in 
' 
the mind of any military man that civilian control should 
not be supreme. 
' ~ ~ 
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' ~ ~ 
I 
ti 
h 
I 
r 
52 
Because the military are never in a position of 
having to resolve a conflict between the orders of the 
Commander-in-Chief, and the Constitution, which it is 
sworn to uphold and defend, there will never be a chal-
lenge' to civilian authority. The responsibility of in-
suring th~t Executive orders are not contrary to the Con-
stitution, which the President has also sworn to uphold, 
is delegated to the Legislative branch of our government. 
Those who "fear" the challenge of the military, 
to civilian supremacy, usually refer to the statement of 
President Eisenhower, in his final address as President, 
when he used the term, "military--industrial complex." 
However, President Eisenhower himself placed the matter 
in its correct perspective when he told a Senate Sub-
committee that, 
The entire Nation, including the armed services, 
insists that in our free system military influ-
ence must be kept within proper constitutional, 
legal, and administrative bounds. Moreover, as 
mentioned in my final address as President, we 
must watchfully.mind the military--industrial 
complex, for it tends to generate powerful eco-
nomic and political pressures beyond the antici-
pations even of the partic;pants themselves. But 
these are matters of proportion and sensible na-
tional leadership, requiring the same kind of 
continuing oversight and perspective that other 
major power groupings in our society including 
business, labor, and governmen~ itself, require 
in the interest of keeping our·system flexible, 
bala~ced, and free. In half a century of national 
.service, I have yet to meet the American military 
officer who viewed himself as a budding Napoleon, 
or even a Rasputin, and I suggest that it is 
worthy of note that in recent world history the 
three major dictators-~Hitler, Mussolini, and 
Stalin--came from civilian life. This fact does 
not warrant a general indictment of civilian mo-
tivation any more than .one or two military·ex-
tremists might warrant the absurd'ity that all the 
military harbors political designs dangerous to 
our constitutional form of government.31 
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One General Edwin A. Walker (ex-General) does not 
constitute a serious threat to our form of government. 
Former S~cretary of Defen~e Robert A. Lovett, 
speaking of the topic at hand, stated: 
Alarmist cries about the lack of civilian control 
over the military, in our Nation, deal with a 
strawman issue. They are concerned with a prob-
lem that does not really exist, and they are di-
visive and damaging by falsely implying that; the 
military does not accept our historic tradition 
of civilian supremacy. Nothing could be more 
wrong. I have been with the military in three 
wars and have worked with them in other govern~ 
mental capacities and I have never heard any 
military commander rais~ the slightest question 
at any time as to their subordination to civil-
ian control.32 
Another former Secretary of Defense, Thomas S. 
Gates, along the same line, said almost the same thing in 
his statement: 
Civilian control, in a historic sense, is 
not debatable. I have never heard it questioned. 
31President Dwight D. Eisenhower as quoted in U.S. 
Senate, Militart Cold War Education and Speech Review 
Policies, op. ct., p. 198. 
32Robert A. Lovett as quoted in Ibid., p. 199. 
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Military men respect it and believe in it. . • • 
No military man nor military group wants po-
litical control. I have no·fear whatsoever in 
this regard. "The man on the white horse" is no 
more real than Don Quixote tilting at windmills 
and is a very foolish worry of some extremists. 
This will not and cannot happen under our system 
and it would never be accepted by responsible 
officers.33 
"The very nature of civil-military relations in 
the United States, and the fact that civilian supremacy 
does prevail, places certain responsibilities on those 
civilians above the military. Admiral Arthur W. Radford 
' 
54 
(USN, retired) pointed out one particular facet of civil-
ian responsibility which has been somewhat neglected. 1134 
He said, 
The citizens of our great country are today 
fortunate in havi~g military services without a 
peer in the world. Their morale has been high, 
and I believe it still is. On the other hand, it 
can b~ quickly and radtcally lowered by attacks 
such as we have witnessed in the recent past. 
Civilian leadership in the Defense Department has 
both the responsibility and the opportunity to 
exercise its authority in defense of active duty 
military personnel who cannot publicly defend 
themselves against unwarranted and unjust civilian 
attacks.35 
This last point is extremely well taken. An ex-
ample of the type of attack that Admiral Radford mentioned 
is pointed out in the Air University Quarterly Review (Fall, 
33Thomas s·. Gates as quoted in Ibid • 
. -
34senator Strom Thurmond,~., p. 201. 
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1961). Speaking of the numerous criticisms in influential 
publications, the Review said, "One writer put it this way: 
"The path to these heights of power and influence is cleared 
for the military and its industrial allies by a public rela-
tions establishment that has no equal in American public or 
private life. The establishment ~ the press, television, 
movies, comic strips, civil organizations, veterans groups, 
schools and troops to sell the military point of view to 
the American people. . • . The channels of communications 
are manipulated each day with taxpayers' money to implant 
the general military view of life on the American people." 
Because the military services are not free agents 
and are, in fact, subordinate elements of the Department of 
pefense, ·the Department should speak out in their defense. 
The military are the instruments of national policy, not 
the formulators. The distinction is vital. Once a deci-
sion has been made. by the properly constituted authorities, 
the military has the obligation to support it loyally with-
out public dissent. This does not mean that the military 
should be (or is) "gagged." Not in the least. In the in-
. 
terest of the Nation, advice should be accepted, even so-
licited before policy concerning the military is formulated. 
The evidence seems to indicate that this is not necessarily 
the case. 
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For example, just recently a magazine article en-
titled "The McNamara Monarchy"," took the Secretary of De-
fense to task for his .. '~one-man Pentagon rule." 
The Washington Post, on March 13, 1963, reported 
that the Secretary promised the House Armed Service Commit-
tee, he will ease up and let others make some of the de-
cisions. 
The Post went on to say that "Representative 
Leslie C. Arends (Ill.) GOP whip and ranking Republican 
on the Committee, took the floor yesterday to charge that 
McNamara, in fact if not in name, had set himself up as a 
single chief of staff for all the armed forces. He accused 
the Secretary of substituting "civilian judgment in matters 
strictly military" and overruling the Joint Chiefs of 
S ff u36 ta • • • . 
A Constitutional Conflict. 
The basic issue involved in these attacks on the 
Secretary of Defense is a constitutional one of the utmost 
importance. Mr. McNamara is the symbol of the Presidency. 
The Congress itself, when it created the Department of 
i 
lj 
36John G. Norris, "One-Man Pentagon Ruie Disclaimed," !: 
The Washington Post, March 13, 1963. 11 
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Defense by the National Security Act of 1947, declared 
that it is established "as an Executive Department of the 
Government." 
Our Constitution divides military power in a manner 
similar to the way it divides other powers. "In spite of 
some public discussion and rather tortured logic by some 
uninformed persons, the entire history of our Government 
establishes clearly and beyond successful challenge that 
'-
the military has been, is now and should be subject to day-
by=day supervision, control management, ~nd administration 
by civilian authority in the executive branch of the Gov-
ernment with all line·s of responsibility leading up to the 
President in his constitutional role as Commander-in-Chief 
of the Armed Forces. It distorts the entire system of 
checks and balances and the very basis of our system of 
government to suggest, as some have, that Congress rather 
than the Chief Executive has primary authority and respon-
sibility in this field." 37 
Under these circumstances, Congress and the Execu-
tive are, to a certain degree, natural antagonists, each 
striving to extend its power at the expense of the other. 
37u.s. Senate, Military Cold War Education and 
Speech Review Policies, op. cit., p. 10. 
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radical change. 
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Congress was given its share of m'ilitary authority 
in the beginning as a check against presidential use of 
his authority to oppress the people. The dangers of a 
military dictatorship were to be countered by enabling 
Congress to refuse funds for too powerful a military es-
tablishment. Today, however, the pressure for a con-
stantly expanding military establishment comes more from 
Congress than the President. 
This is clearly seen in the current controversies 
over manned bombers vs. missiles, the award of contracts 
for an all-service aircraft (TFX), and the debate on stra-
tegic bomber-reconnaissance aircraft development (RS-70). 
The Secretary of Defense has, on occasion, decided 
against the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The wis-
dome of his decisions remain for history to decide. The 
past has shown that the professional personnel of the 
armed services usually have greater knowledge and experi-
ence in making technical decisions in their area than any 
political appoi~tee. However, if the final authority over 
-. 
both technical and policy matters is lodged in Congress 
rather than in the Executive branch, the real power will 
be held by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. ·This, in itself, 
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would be a violation of the principle of civilian control, 
which we have discussed. 
Although it is not to be found in writing any-
where, the "military" frequently serve as the ball in a 
tennis game in which the opposing sides are the Congress 
and local, selfish constituents oa the one side and the 
Executive branch on the other. 
"The greatest single task of an efficient Secre-
tary of Defense is to taper off production of weapons and 
weapons systems as they become obsolescent and to stop 
building them as soon as they become obsolete. 
Nothing has been said, despite the sudden spate 
of criticism, to shake faith in the judgment and competence 
of Mr. McNamara, and the Nation desperately needs such 
ability as his.n 38 
/ 
There are many reasons why the final authority 
should not be vested in Congress. Not only would it be a 
violation of the principle of civilian control (since the 
JCS would, in effect, have control), but the dangers of 
local pressure, that exist in a Congress whose members rep-
resent no national constituency, would increase tremen-
dously. This poiat of view was well summed up by the late 
38
"Mr. McNamara' s Ordeal," Christian 
March 19, 1963, p. 21. 
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Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King. In his thesis "The Influ-
ence of National Policy on the Strategy of War" written at 
the Naval War College in November of 1932, he said, 
Too much, by far, do representatives depend for 
their re-election upon the real benefits procured 
for their districts, thus leading to the scrutiny 
of national expenditures from the point of view 
not of the good of the whole, nor even the greatest 
good for the greatest number, but rather of the 
individual, whether voter or official.39 
Perhaps the solution to this facet of the problem, 
if, indeed, there is a solution, is in electing honest_,. 
dedicated, impartial, and informed representatives that will 
have the interests of the Nation uppermost in their minds--
not jus~ the interest of their state or local district. 
As is true of most of the crucial decisions in a 
democracy--at least those that ultimately affect the Nation 
as a whole--the decision must be made by the highest author-
ity in the Nation--the electorate. 
The Dangers,-and Alternatives 
Which brings us directly back to the problem of 
freedom of information in our democracy. Being a democracy, 
39Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, "The ·Influence of 
National Policy on the Strategy ·of a War," Thesis··; Naval 
War College, Norfolk, Va., November, 1938, as quoted in 
"Behind TFX Case," The New York Times, Western Edition, 
March 21, 1963. 
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the government ~ disseminate adequate information to 
the electorate. "It is obvious that the basis·for decision 
is information, and if vital information is withheld, no 
amount of popular scrutiny can determine the facts in-
, 40 
valved." Without the "facts involved," the electorate 
cannot make the correct decisions and we can "kiss" our 
form of government goodbye. 
On the other hand, if we give out such information 
as to enable an enemy to conquer us by force, we can watch 
it go up in smoke. 
The alternative is the striking of the proper 
balance between the dissemination of that information 
necessary to retain our democratic system of government and 
the withholding of such official information as is required 
to maintain our freedom. 
We cannot, however, in attempting to balance the 
Right to Know vs.the Need to Know, condone any official 
withholding of information that is not in the interest of 
the entire Nation, or resort to the tactics of a totalitar-
ian state where the official declaration that "government 
generated news is a weapon" might be accepted--it is not 
and will not be accepted in this country. 
40Berna~d Rubin, Public Relations and the Empire 
State, op. cit., p. 67. 
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CHAPTER III 
MANAGING THE NEWS 
News Weaponry 
Arthur Krock, a long. time columnist of The New 
York Times, in an article written for Fortune magazine 
(March, 1963) said, 
In my professional 'lexicon, active management of the 
news by Government consists of attempts by any offi-
cial unit or individual in an area of authority to 
influence the presentation of news~ This can be 
done by suppression, concealment, distortion, and 
false weighting of the facts to which the public is 
entitled (this excludes the areas in which national 
security is plainly or.potentially involved)o It 
can be done through threats, or implications of 
threats, of shutting off legitimate sources of in-
formation to reporters who have dug out facts whose 
publication embarrasses Government for personal, 
policy, or political reasons •... 1 
J 
As is obvious even to a casual observer, there is a 
great deal of talk about news management in the government 
these dayso However, a brief glimpse into history w~ll re-
veal that almost every administration has tried to manage 
the news to a certain extent. While it is true, I oelieve, 
1Arthur Krock, "Mro Kennedy's Management of the 
News," Fortune, Volume LXVII, Noo 3 (March, 1963), p. 82. 
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that the present administration has deliberately sought to 
magnify each of its accomplishments and minimize its short-
comings, the same is true of virtually ~very administra-
tion and government in history--it is, ·ind~ed, a political 
fact of life. 
In an amusing albeit apropos article, Art Buchwald 
said, 
We found an old transcript the other day of a press 
briefing between Abraham Lincoln's press secretary 
and White House reporters, which show that even in 
those days attempts were made to bottle up vital 
news of interest to the public. Here are excerpts 
from it: 
QUESTION: Mr. Nicolay, yesterday the President 
gave a speech at Gettysburg, and he started it out 
by saying, "Four score and seven years ago our fathers 
brought forth on this continent·a new nation." Sir, 
would~you mind telling us the names of the fathers 
he was referring to? 
SECRETARY: I'm sorry, gentlemen. I can't reveal 
the names at this time. 
QUESTION: The Saturday Evening Post, which is 
published in Philadelphia, said he was referring to 
Washington, Jefferson, and Franklin. . 
SECRETARY: That's just conjecture. The President 
is not responsible for everything written by his 
friends. 
QUESTION: The President said yesterday in the 
same speech that the country was engaged in a great 
civil ~ar, testing whether that nation or any nation 
so conceived and so dedicated can long endureo He 
didn't say how he intended to win the war. Does 
this mean he has a no-win policy? 
SECRETARY: The President in his speech was only 
concerned with the battle of Gettysburg, which 
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incidentally we won. The Department of War will 
give you full details on other battles. ', 
QUESTION: The department refuses to give us 
any information. We don't know how many troops 
were used at Gettysburg, who commanded them, or how 
many casualties there were. All we were given were 
some po~r photos of Confederate gun emplacements. 
How can we be sure the Confederates still don't have 
artillery hid4en in the hills around Gettysburg? 
SECRETARY: We have constant surveillance of the 
hills. To the best of our knowledge all Southern· 
artillery pieces have been removed. 
. . QUESTION: What about Confederate troops? There 
are an estimated 17,000 in the area. 
SECRETARY: We have the South's promise th~y will 
be removed in due course. 
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QUES%ION: Mr. Secretary, why didn't Mrs. Lincoln 
go with the President to Gettysburg? · ·· 
SECRETARY: Mrs. Lincoln feels that her place is 
at home with her children. But she did send a tele-
gram. 
QUESTION: In talking about the government of the 
people, for the people, and by the people, did the 
Pres~dent have any particular group in mind? 
SECRETARY: Not to my knowledge, gentlemen. But 
I'll check it out· just to make sure. 
QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, the President in his 
speech· yesterday indicated he intended to manage the 
news. 
SECRETARY: How did he do that? 
QUESTION: He said in the same speech~ "The world 
will little note nor long remember what was said here." 
It seems to me in this phrase he was intimidating the 
newspapermen who were there. 
SECRETARY: I don't think you have to interpret the 
speech in that manner. The President's remarks, 
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written on an envelope, were off the cuff, and he 
felt there was no reason to be quoted. An official 
version of his speech will be made available to the 
press in due time, as soon as the President has a 
chaace to go over it again.2 
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Unfortunately, there are many--too many--examples 
of news management and suppression in our history. 
In the summer of 1947 Lt. General Albert C. Wede-
myer was sent to the Orient to analyze the situation in 
China for the government and, since we were not at war, 
presumably for the people as well. What he found, and re-
ported, was bad news from the standpoint of the administra-
tion then in power, and it was not given to the public. 
General Wedemyer did in fact, foresee the collapse 
of the Chiang Kai-shek Government. The news that was man-
aged--or more correctly, suppressed--in October, 1947 was 
prophetically worded as follows: 
Continued deterioration of the situation (in China) 
may result in establishment of a Soviet satellite in 
Manchuria and ultimately in a communist-dominated 
China, which would be inimicable to the United States' 
interests.3 
Surely it would have been better for this report to have 
been publicly aired--perhaps if it was, the Government of 
2Art Buchwald, "Lincoln Managed the News," The 
Boston Sunday Globe, March 3, 1963. ---
3Kent Cooper, The Right to Know, op. cit, p. 280. 
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the Republic of China, the Chinese Government that we now 
recognize, would not be confined to an island a mere 230 
miles long by 90 miles wide (Taiwan). 
The problem, assuredly, is not new. Herbert Brucker 
said, "~n the twenty-four centuries since the republic of 
Rome gave them their name, censors have sought to regulate 
an amazing range of human conduct. Even today, in this 
land of freedom there is considerable o • • censorship. 
n4 
• • 0 
Carrying the practice back as far as we dare, James 
Reston of The New York Times suggests that it (news manage-
ment) goes back to the Garden of Eden. "Adam and Eve man-
aged the news to brighten their own images. The apple was 
a distortion; she tempted him with something els~)•5 
Some of the more recent examples of the way news is 
"managed," reflect the awareness of the present administra-
tion of the importance of the mass media--particularly tele-
vision. To date, the President has .utilized "live" televi-
sion for 31 of his 53 press conferences. Former Pre·sidents 
Truman and Eisenhower, the first to have access to full 
scale television if they desired to use it, did not make 
~erbert Brucker, Freedom of Information, op. cit., 
p. 169 0 
5
"How Much Management of the News?" Newsweek, 
Volume XXI, No. 14 (April 8, 1963), p. 59. 
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comparable use of this medium. 
Franklin D. Roosevelt was the first President to 
put any stress on news management. It is said that he 
"charmed" many newspapermen. His news conferences were 
masterfully handled and he had a unique grasp of how public 
opinion could be "manipulated!' Radio was put to wide and 
extensive use by President Roosevelt and, via the air waves, 
he "sold" the New Deal. 
'·_President Kennedy follows more in the footsteps of 
. 
Roosevelt than any of his other predecessors, and he has a 
great deal more power and technical assistance ·available to 
him. Bes-ide the "live" TV news conferences, the President 
has appeared on TV (starting with the debates with Richard 
Nixon) on innumerable occasions encompassing such events 
as the State of the Union Message, the Cuban Crisis, his 
visit to Strategic Air Command (SAC) Headquarters, polit-
ical ralli~s, and so on. 
If the vehicle that carried the New Deal forward 
was the radio, it follows that the New Frontier is being 
carried forward by television-~or rather by skillful use 
of it--as well as of all the media. 
A glimpse at some of the current crop of contra-
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manipulating, or suppressing. 
In the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, it 
seems as though every stratagem, including even that of 
false information, was used to cover up the extent of Amer-
ica~ involvement. Only recently did the American people 
learn that some American pilots were killed during the 
April, 1961 attack. Officially, these pilots were "vol-
unteers"--not members of the U.S. Air Force, CIA, or any 
other government agency. An official investigation and 
subsequent report on the invasion has never been released 
to the public. Selected parts of a congressional investi-
gation were "leaked" to the people when they helped create 
an impression that was favorable to the Administrationo A 
full two years after the event, charges and counter-charges 
are still being made~=the latest by Dr. Jose Miro Cardona, 
president of the Cuban Revolutionary Council, who accused 
the United States of backing down on promises to act 
against Cuba. 
On October 31, 1962, just six days prior to the 
Congressional elections, a report was issued by the Labor 
Department stating that "over 4,500,000 more Americans 
have jobs than when this Administration took office in 
January of 1961." This was "news" to support the Admin-
istration. However, after the election, official 
I ,, 
•I 
,I 
I 
\l ,, 
I[ 
il 
il 
!i 
il 
'I 
I· 
" !i 
ii 
il 
ii 
II 
I' 
I! 
II 
I; 
il 
II 
II 
:I 
II 
II 
II 
i! 
I 
il 
!i 
il 
II 
I' I' 
II ,, 
11 
;I 
II 
II 
69 
statistics showed that the 4.5 million figure had not been 
adjusted to take into account normal seasonal differences 
in employment between the months of January and October. 
' In other words, the figure exaggerated by about three m~l-
lion the number of jobs the Administration could rightly 
· .. 
claim credit for. 
Th~re are numerous other examples that could be 
cited as.indicative of the trend to "manage" news. Briefly 
stated, there was the Steel Price Crisis of April, 1962, 
the Stevenson (Adlai) "Leak" Affair, the Skybolt Missile 
disagreement, the Canadian episode, and so on. 
However, it was the Cuban crisis of October, 1962 
that brought the "management of news" controversy to a head. 
"If there had been no Cuban prisis, there would be no in-
formation crisis, or at least none of the present magni-
tude."6 
Certain Axioms Reaffirmed 
Before examining the allegation, it is important, 
I think, to reaffirm certain axioms: 
First, in a democracy such as ours, the press is 
vital as the "fourth branch" of government to ascertain 
6 !12!2.· ' p. 60. 
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that any deceptions, suppressions, or half-truths are dis-
closed, so that a correction can be made. 
Second, the press cannot adequately accomplish 
this task unless it has free access to the news--not to 
-
' 
classified information. The freedom of the press guaran-
teed by the Constitution makes it mandatory, in my opinion, 
that the press ferret out the news. The dilemma at this 
point seems to have more horns than the proverbial two. 
"Suppression of the news (by the Government) • • • is 
discordant with the theory of democracy," 7 yet thfa Govern-
ment has the obligation to withhold information of value 
to an enemy--on the other hand it has been said that "if 
the press ·devoted t~e energy to covering the news that it 
devotes to bellyaching-about freedom of information, the 
public would be much better informed."8 
Continuing with the axioms, we mus~ never lose 
'sight of the fact that these are not "normal" times. We 
are engaged in a Cold War, which even though not declared, 
is as extensive and crucial (if not more so) than any war 
in our history. As has been so well observed- previously, 
7 Kent Cooper, op. cit., p. 281. 
8Newbold Noyes, J~. , as quoted in "How Much Man-
agement of the News?" Newsweek, op. cit., p. 63. 
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this war is waged in every co~ceivable way--politically, 
economically, militarily, and through propaganda. 
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Although these are, admittedly, not normal times, 
the increasing complexity of events, the need for interpre-
tation of events rather than just raw facts, and the re-
quirement for national understanding make it absolutely 
necessary that the flow of information be as free as pos-
sible. Governmental censorship is one thing, and the 
deliberate falsification of facts by government is another. 
A New York Times editorial of May 10, 1961, insists that 
free government demands an informed people and that offi-
cial falsehoods are ethically unacceptable, foolish, and 
incompatible with the precepts and requirements of free 
governments. "A democracy--our democracy--cannot be lied 
to."9 
In the light of these axioms, the questions that 
require examination are: Has there, in fact, been manage-
ment and censorship of the news? And are such actions 
justified? 
The Cuban Crisis 
Inasmuch as it was the Cuban (1962) crisis that 
brought the debate to its "present magnitude," the facts 
9"The Right Not To Be Lied To," .... The New York Times, 
May 10, 1961, p. ·44. 
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of that episode and the aftermath need to be looked at 
clearly and carefully. 10 
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Ever since January 7, 1959, when the United States 
recognized the new revolutionary Cuban Government, U.S.-
Cuban relations have continued to deteriorate. On January 
3, 1961, after almost two full years of Fidel Castro's 
anti-American and pro-Communist maneuyers, the United 
~tates terminated. diplomatic relations with Cuba. 
Although ·the shipment of Communis·t arms to Cuba had 
been going on s~eadily for some time, the Soviet Union an-
nounced early in September, 1962 that it had agreed to send 
further military equipment and supplies. In addition, the 
regime in Cuba simultaneously announced that any invasion 
of the island would endanger world peace. These pronounce-
ments precipitated the crisis and brought fo~th the follow-
ing statement by President Kennedy at a press conference on 
September 13, 1962: 
There has been a great deal of talk on the situ-
ation in Cuba in recent days both in the Communist 
camp and in our own, and I woul~ like to take this 
opportunity to set the matter in perspective. 
In the first place, it is Mr. Castro and his sup-
porters who are in trouble. In the last year, his 
regime has been increasingly isolated from this hemi-
sphere. 
o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o a o o • o 
10see Appendix A, p. 109, for a detailed chronolog-
ical review of major developments leading up to the Cuban 
crisis of 1962. 
d 
I! 
'I ,, 
II 
II 
•I 
!! 
I' 
r; 
I 
Ever since Communism moved into Cuba in 1958, 
Soviet technical and military personnel have moved 
steadily onto the island in increasing.numbers at 
the invitation of the Cuban government. 
Now that movement has been increased. It is 
under our most careful surveillance. But I will re-
peat the conclusion that I reported last week, that 
these new shipments do not constitute a serious 
threat to any other part of this hemisphere. 
• • • 0 0 0 0 0 0 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 • • 0 • • 0 
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But let me make this clear once again: If at 
any time the Communist build-up ·in Cuba were to 
endanger or interfere with our security in any way, 
including our base at Guantanamo, our passage to the 
Panama Canal, our missile and space activities at 
Cape Canaveral, or the lives of American citizens in 
this country, or if Cuba should ever attempt to ex-
port its aggressive purposes by force or the threat 
of force against any nation in this hemisphere, or 
become an offensive military base of significant 
capacity for the Soviet Union, then this country 
will do whatever must be done to protect its own 
security and that of its allies. 
0 0 0 0 0 0 d 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 • 0 
We shall continue to work with Guban refugee 
leaders who are dedicated as we are to that nation's 
future return to freedom.- We shall continue to keep 
the American people and the Congress fully informed. 
We shall increase our surveillance of the whole 
Caribbean area. We shall neither initiate nor per-
mit aggression in this hemisphere. 
This seemed to set the stage for the "really big 
show" of October, 1962. Exactly one week following the 
President's statement, and after considerable debate in 
both the U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate, a 
joint resolution (230) was approved by the Sen~te by a vote 
of 87 to 1. On September 26 the House approved the resolu-
tion by a vote of 384 to 7. This resolution cited the 
Monroe Doctrine (1823), the Rio Treaty (1947), and the 
,, 
I~ 
jl 
II 
li 
•I 
!I 
il 
J; 
I 
,, 
I' 
If 
,, 
II 
I' 
if 
,, 
If 
II 
II 
II 
il 
il 
I, 
1: 
II 
II 
I' II I 
II 
,, 
!/ 
,, 
·I 
rl 
II 
II 
i' 
11 
,I 
" 
" tl 
II 
il 
il 
II 
I 
II 
I' 
If 
I• 
I' 
:I ,, 
i ~ 
ii I, 
:I 
if 
II 
1: 
II 
:r 
II 
il 
I' II 
74 
declaration by the Foreign Ministers of the Organization of 
American States (January, 1962) as more than sufficient 
authority for remedial action, if deemed necessary. It was: 
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives 
of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
That the United States is determined--(a) to prevent by whatever means may be necessary, 
including the use of arms, the Marxist-Leninist regime 
in Cuba from extending, by force or the threat of 
force, its aggressive or subversive activities to any 
part of this hemisphere; (b) to prevent in Cuba the creation or use of an 
externally supported military capability endangering 
the security of the United States; and 
(c) to work with the Organization of American 
States and with freedom-loving Cubans to support the 
aspirations of the Cuban people for self-determination. 
· During the crisis itself it was alleged that the 
press was deceived in these respects: that in the week pre-
ceding October 22, 1962 it was told the Pentagon had no in-
formation indicating that offensive missiles had been placed 
by the Russians in Cuba; that it had been misled about the 
movement of troops; that the President's "cold," given as 
the reason for his return to Washington, did not, in fact, 
exist. 
What had been happening in·that fateful week? On 
~O!J.d~y_, October ~5, .the government hac:I its .. first reports on 
~he aerial surveys which eventually confirmed the presence 
~f.Sov~et missiles in Cuba; on Thursday, the President met 
wi~~ ~ndrei Gro~yko, who_did not mention the ~ea~on~; on 
Fr~day additional evidence was gathered that confirme.d the 
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fact that offensive weapons were, indeed, being installed 
in Cuba by the Soviet Union; on Saturday and Sunday the 
President conferred almost continuously with the National 
Security Council and various aides to determine a course 
of action; on Monday, October 22, 1962, the confrontation 
took place when President Kennedy addressed the Nation on 
the Cuban situation. Commenting on the missile sites in 
Cuba and the danger the missiles present to the security 
of the United States and the Western Hemisphere, the Presi-
dent said that he had ordered a "quarantine" on all such 
offensive weapons for Cuba and insisted that the Soviet 
Union remove the missiles. 11 
This so-called management of the news on Cuba was 
followed by several other actions and commeats that have 
added to the complex of accusation. On October 27, a De-
fense Department memorandum outlining procedures for deal-
ing with media representatives was issued. 
The substance of each interview and telephone con-
versation with a media representative will be re-
ported to the appropriate Public Information Of-
fice before the close of business that day. A re-
port need not be made if a representative of the 
public information office is present at the inter-
view. 
11see Appendix B, p. 116, for the full text of 
President John F. Kennedy's Report to the P~ople, October 
22, 1962. 
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Four days later the State Department issued a directive to 
its personnel to the same affect. 
Hence the Hue and Cry 
On October 30 Arthur Sylvester, the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs said that the 
handling of Government news in the Cuban crisis was a "part 
of the arsenal of weaponry" available to the President. 
The following statement by Mr. Sylvester is, I be-
lieve, the virus that has caused the recent outbreak of 
news management charges: 
News generated by actions of the Government as to 
content and timing are part of the arsenal of 
weaponry that the President has in the application 
of military force and related forces to the solu-
tion of political problems, or to the application 
of international political pressure. In the kind 
of world we live in the generation of news by ac-
tions taken by the Government becomes one weapon 
in a strained situation. The results, in my opin-
ion, justify the methods we used.12 
Out of these actions and pronouncements came the 
indictments--and the .hue and cry heard throughout the 
Nation. 
A very small sampling of the editorial comment 
(following Sylvester's comment) across the country is in-
dicative of the fact that most editors and newsmen felt 
12statement by Arthur Sylvester, October 30, 1962. 
there was indeed "management of the news." For example, 
The New York Times (October 31, 1962) said, 
Arthur Sylvester . o o frankly admitted the govern-
ment had manag~d, controlled and dammed up the flow 
of news about the Cuban crisis, and he indicates it 
expected to continue to do so. 
. . . to attempt to manage the news so that a free 
p~ess should. speak (in Sylvester's words) in "one 
voice to your a4versary" could·be far more danger-
ous to the ca~se of fr~edom th~n the free play of 
dissent. . . o 
The Washington Post (November 1, 1962) continued in the 
'· 
same vein~with, 
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The acknowledgment by . • • Sylvester that the gov-
ernment used its power to control information about 
th~ Cuban situation not only to safeguard the mili-
tary security of the country, but to further national 
policy, will alarm an4 distress many people. 
. . . Sylvester combined the func·tions of propaganda, 
censorship and military control of the news • 
• o • in .any crisis hereafter, citizens will wonder 
if they are be~ng ·~old the truth or what the gpvern~ 
ment thinks will favorably influence events. 
The Baltimore Sun (November 1, 1962) headed an editorial 
l 
"New Censor Rul~s :Recall Goebbels." "Pentagon Censorship," 
was the label applied by the Dallas Morning Ne~s (November 
2, 1962) while the Tulsa Daily World (November 2, 1962) 
' j ~ '• i: I 
proclaimed, "News Control Sets Dangerous Pattern." The 
-
Washington Evening Star (October 31, 1962) summed it up 
t, 
quite succinctly when it ~aid, 
-. 
Mr. Sylvester-is to be commended for his frank~ 
ness, at least. But he has let an ugly cat out 
of the bag. 
. • . The "kind of world we live in" seems now to 
be a world in which the truth given the American 
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people of what happened is that part of the truth 
selected by officialdom to piece together a desir-
able image. That image may be a distortion, the 
inevitable result of an attempt to use the press 
and its news as instruments of national policy. 
One may hope that having tasted the·' fruits of 
a. use of power more readily identified with the 
Soviet Union, with Hitler, Mussolini and a long 
string of new if lesser dictators than with our 
own country, those in high places will now realize 
that this fruit is poison and discard it before 
an antidote becomes necessary. 
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On Novemper 27 the State Department rescinded its 
directive requiring reports on contacts with newsmen, 
after protests from the correspondents covering the De-
partment. The Pentagon directive, however, has not been 
rescinded-~but it is not now being observed as rigidly as 
when it was issued. 
The Right to Lie? 
There is, it seems to me, more than one way to 
look at the managing of the news controversy. I do not 
contend for a moment that our Government has the "inherent 
~ig~t to lie to save itself when faced with nuclear 
disaster," 1~ as Mr. Sylvester has so unwisely put it. If 
it is inherently right for the Government to lie and for 
the news media to propagate the Government's lies, then it 
13Ibid., December 6, 1962. 
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naturally follows that it must be unpatr~.~tic to challenge 
those.lies. It would be unpatriotic to challenge th~ word 
of the Goyernment during a crisis, for obviously that'would 
endanger the Nation. Moreover, it would be "wrong" to 
speak up after the crisi$, because the next time the Govern-
ment issued a lie, it would not be believed. Following this 
line of reasoning then, anyone who speaks. the truth, as op-
ll [i 
(I 
'I 
II 
ij 
II 
posed to ·the 9fficial lie, is a traitor, for he is j eopardiz- ii 
lj 
ing the survival of the Nationo 
On the other side of the coin, the Government is ~-
quired to suppress certain information. As Mro Sylvester 
said in testimony to the House Subcommittee on Government 
Information (on March 25, 1962), "· o . in times of crisis 
information which ordinarily would be made available to our 
citizens must temporarily be withheld in order to deny it 
0 ,,14 to our enem1.e s o 
Mro Sylyester, answering charges of "news manage-
ment" also said "It is my belief that truthful, factual in-
. 
formation must be the basis for the UoS. Government's in-
formation progr~.in relation to the American people. And 
that is the-policy that has been followed in the Defense 
14Arthur Sylvester, Statement Before the Foreign· 
Operations and Government Information Subcommittee, March 
25, 1963 (mimeographed), p. 2. 
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Department since I became Assistant Se~retary of Defense 
for Public Affairs with, of course, due concern for na-
tional security and in the case of the Cuban crisis, the 
lives of American military personnel."15 
Both Arthur Sylvester and Robert J. Manning, the 
Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, appear-
ing before the House Subcommittee (previously cited) 
agreed that the flow of news sometimes has to be slowed 
in the interests of national security. Mr. Sylvester 
said, 
. • • when we look at the Cuban situation in per-
spective, we see that for reasons of national sur-
vival some information about our defensive actions 
was temporarily withheld so that our Government 
could act without giving advance notice to our 
adversaries. But as soon after the event as the 
decision could be safely taken, the full story 
was told.l6 
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Mr. Manning, obviously in less "hot water" than 
Mr. Sylvester said, "the State Department is as wide open 
as Y~nkee Stadium, and the admission is free •. " In a more 
serio~s moment, Mr. Manning said that under certain cir-
cumstances the Government required an interlude of secrecy 
in which to conduct certain delicate negotiations or to 
v 
15Ibid. 
16tbid., p. 13. 
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perfect certain policies. Premature disclosure would have 
the same effect, he added, "as it does on photographic 
film." Oppo'sing this, he said, is the right of the public 
in a democratic society to be fully informed about the 
policies of its Government. 
One statement that seems to sum up a lot that has 
been said about managing the news was made by Mr. Sylvester 
to the Subcommittee. He said, 
A free press and an enlightened people are essential-to 
the very existen~e of our democratic form of Government. 
• • . The necessitx for enlightenment of our people 
[the Right to Knowj is tempered by the necessity to 
preserve our Government and to protect the people [the 
Need to Know].l7 · 
Two Kinds of News or Information 
It is of the utmost importance in this discussion 
to differentiate between two kinds of news (or information) 
involved in the debate. First there is the news of secret 
operations or secret negotiations~-the kind of covert (or 
black) warfare which we normally associate with the Commun-
ists. However, we also resort to such activities in the 
necessity of fighting fire with fire and propaganda with 
propaganda. As a former Secretary of State said, in 
l7!E!£., pp. 1-2. Comments in bracket mine. 
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discussing the responsibility of the United States to 
secure information we must have for protection against a 
sneak attack: 
The Government of the United States would be dere-
lict to its responsibility not only to the American 
p~ople, but to free peoples everywhere if it did 
not, in the absence of Soviet cooperation, take 
such measures as are possible unilaterally to les-
sen and overcome this danger of surprise attack. • • 
the President [Eisenhowerj has put into effect 
since the beginning of his Administration directives 
to gather by every possible means the information 
required to ~rotect the United States and the Free 
World. . • • 8 
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The second kind of news or information that is in-
volved is that kind which may place the government in an 
unfavorable light, but which is nevertheless information 
that should be made known. 
These two types of information or news should not 
be confused. 
Returning to the first category of information, 
there is no doubt that "the right of a free people to know 
what is being done in its name is in open conflict with 
the necessity for secret operations.~• 19 Keeping in mind 
the responsibility of a free press, I am compelled to ask, 
18secretary of State Christian A. Herter, Statement 
for the Press, issued by Lincoln White, 9 May 1962, the 
White House. Emphasis mine. 
19Murray. Dyer, The Weapon on the Wall (B~ltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins Press, 1959), p. 180. 
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what would the critics have done·in the Cuban crisis? 
It seems rather strange to me that the majority 
of the newspapers (and newsmen) which praised the Presi-
dent for bringing the Soviet Union to heel (in Cuba any-
way), then proceeded to criticize him for the way in which 
he performed the deed. 
Mr. John Colburn, Chairman of the Committee on 
Freedom of Information of the American Society of News-
paper Editors said· in a report, that news (in the course 
of the Cuban crisis) was generated by government actions 
to implement a government pr~paganda policy and that there 
has developed within the administration a coricept that 
the United States must speak with "one voice" in times of 
crisis. 
Would the critics have had the President reveal 
his suspicions about the missile sites prior to photo-
graphic confirmation? Would they have had the confirming 
photographs published, and the proposal to confront the 
Russians discussed publicly? There is no doubt that such 
a procedure would have enabled the Communists to take the 
steps necessary to deny the accusation and certainly would 
have removed the element of surprise which was so important 
psychologically. It seems evident that the end {the back-
ing down of Khrushchev) could har~ly have been achieved 
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without the means employed. 
Mr. Clark Mollenhoff CWashington correspondent for 
the Cowles papers) has had a great deal to say about news 
management and calls such action "self-serving." Is 
Mr. Mollenhoff, along with the other critics (such as 
Arthur Krock, New York Times; Hanson W. Baldwin, New York 
Times; Mark S. Watson, Baltimore Sun, etc.) saying that . 
the government should not engage in propaganda--in the good 
sense of the word--and that the President was motivated by 
personal (or party) interests rather than the national 
interest? I do not think that this is their intent. 
It seems then that some of the excitement about 
managed news, at least with respect to the first, or se-
\ 
cret, category of news is unjustified. Since we must, of 
necessity, continue to engage in covert operations, they 
must remain secret. We must put a certain amount of faith 
in the President and depend on him to decide how much news 
of this kind will be released·. Only he has access to all 
the facts and I feel sure that he is aware of the premise 
that covert operations "must accept as their first and 
basic rule of operation the position that any decision to 
undertake a particular piece of work, in secret, must be 
subjected to the test of whether, if it becomes known, the 
damage it will do to our acknowledged aims, openly stated, 
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will do more harm than is acceptable if we are still to 
maintain that we are an honorable and e;thical people. n20 
As for the charge that the government spoke "with 
'• 
one voice," it is well to remember that this was not a 
suggestion that the Nation speak with one voice at all 
times. The statement was only that in times of crisis 
one official or one branch of the Government should not 
contradict what another was saying, and, most importantly, 
what the President was saying. 
Conflicting Statements 
An excellent example of "many voices" in a time 
of crisis, and the chaotic result, is the aftermath of the 
U-2 affair of May, 1960. The fact that a U.S. plane had 
been shot down was~ first announced by Soviet Premier 
.' 
Khrushchev on May 5, 1960 (although t~e a~rcraft was miss-
ing since May ls~). For two days following this announce-
ment, the Ame~ican Government loudly insisted that the air-
craft was a weather observation plane that ha~ a~cidently 
violated Soviet air space when it crossed the Turkish-
Soviet border due to a failure in the plane's oxygen 
equipment. 
20Ibid., p. 175. 
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Statements were issued by the White House, the State 
Department, and the National Aeronautics and Space Adminis-
tration (NASA), and were confusing if not contradictory. 
) 
In retrospect, it can be said that some of the s~a~efuents 
made were not too clever. Consider for a moment, the ridi-
cule with which we might great a Soviet statement that a 
Russian aircraft had "accidentally" violated American air-
space--if the aircraf~ was over Salt Lake City, Utah, a 
comparable geographical analogy to Sverdlovsk, U.S.S.Ro, 
where the U-2 was shot down. 
"Comrades," said Nikita Khurshchev as he addressed 
the Supreme Soviet on May 7th, "I must let you in on a 
secret. When I made my report (original report on the U-2, 
May 5th), I deliberately refrained from mentioning that 
the pilot was alive and healthy, and that we had the rem-
nants of the plane. We did this deliberately, because bad 
we give~~~~the whole story, the America~s would have 
.... . 
thought ~p another version."21 
Khrushchev had set the trap well. Our Government 
was forced into a rapid about~face, caught, as it were, 
with our pants down. The statement that was issued to the 
2lnavid Wise and Thomas Ross, The U-2 Affair (New 
York: Bantam Books, 1962), p. 6"5. 
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press of May 7, 1960, said, 
The Department has received the text of 
Mr. Khrushchev's further remarks about the un-
armed plane which is reported to have been shot 
down in the Soviet Union. As previously an-
nounced, it was known that a U-2 plane was miss-
ing. As a result of the inquiry ordered.by the 
President, it fias been established that insofar 
as the authorities in Washington are concerned, 
there was no authorization for any such flight. 
Nevertheless it appears that in endeavoring 
to obtain information now concealed behind the 
Iron Curtain, a flight over Soviet territory was 
probably undertaken by an unarmed civilian U-2 
plane. • • . 
One of the things creating tension in the 
world today is apprehension over surprise attack 
with weapons of mass destruction. • • . It is 
in relation to the danger of surprise attack 
that planes of the type of unarmed civilian U-2 
aircraft have made flights a~ong the frontiers 
of the Free World for the past four years.22 
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It seems painfully obvious that· the United States 
did not have one good plan ready in the eventthe Soviets 
did capture the pilot of a U-2, alive. To anyone who 
studies the conflicting statements issued to the press, 
it will be apparent that no decision (in advance) was made 
whether we would or would not admit the overflights. In 
effect, we admitted everything, but in a hazy sort of a way. 
The last of the statements issued with regard to 
the U-2 affair was released on May 9, 1960, one week prior 
to the Paris Summit Conference that all the world hoped 
22~., pp. 73-74. 
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would bring same small measure of thaw to the Cold War. The 
new statement admitted that we had been engaged in aerial 
spying for years, including overflights of Russia, and that 
the President ~ aware of these flights. It blamed the 
~oviet Union for making these flights necessary and left the 
strong implication that they might continue. The failure 
of the Summit Conference is written in the history books. 
A testimonial, perhaps, to "many voices" during a crisis. 
News or information in the second category--the kind 
which may place the government in an unfavorable light and 
is suppressed in an effort to shield officials from criti-
cism--is entirely different in character and should be 
) 
treated in ~n entirely different manner. 
This is the type of news that can so readily be man-
aged. "The goal is to get the public to have those view-
points and selected facts that are in tune with the objec-
tives of the individuals and party in power."23 
Here the warnings of Messrs. Krock, Baldwin, Mollen-
hoff, Watson, Colburn, et al., must be car~f~lly heeded. 
There is always, in critical times like these a necessity 
for classifying certain information. It is in these'areas 
2 ~"How News is 'Managed' by Officials in Washington," 
U.S. News and World Report, Volume LIV; No. 15 (April 15, . 
196 3) ' p 0 38 0 
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that there must be close examination by the government of 
what is being withheld and a full alertness on the part~of 
the press in ferreting out any unjustified conceal~ent. 
There must be, above all, the closest possible adherence to 
the fundamental principle of freedom of the press. "Any 
official withholding of news from the public is an out-
right denial of the theory of democracy. The people can-
not rule unless they have the facts upon which to base 
their judgements. n 24 The people would not want the facts 
on properly classified information knowing that publica-
tion of such facts ·would aid only the ~nemy. 
I 
A Balanced View is Required 
The New York Times (Octbber 31, 1962), summed up 
the requirement for a balanced view ~ith the following: 
There is no doubt that "management" or "con-
trol" of the news is censorship described by a 
sweeter term. There is no doubt that it restricts 
the people's right to know. There is no doubt 
that public positions upon great national issues 
cannot be intelligently formed unless the facts 
are available. There is no doubt that a democratic 
government cannot work if news of and about the 
government is long suppress~d or managed or manipu-
lated or controlled. 
There is also no doubt that in time of crisis a 
sense of responsib~lity and restraint on the part of 
24
"Pentagon Censorship," Dallas Morning News, 
November 2, 1962. · · 
all public information media is imperative. The 
withholding by voluntary restrictions or, in time 
of war by censorship, of certain types of mili-
tary and security information is imperative.25 
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The critical phrase here is "withholding by voluntary re-
strictions." Surely the Times does not propose to leave 
it up to the newsman to decide what security information 
will be printed and what not printed. As the President 
asked at his press conference on November 20, 1962, "Are 
we suggesting that any member of the Defense Department 
should speak on any subject to any newspaperman? That the 
newspaperman should print it or not print it as he sees 
fit without any effort to attempt to limit the printing 
of news which may deal with intelligence information?"26 
Certainly this is a pertinent query and one that deserves 
a great deal of thought, especially by newsmen. I do not 
believe -~he average newsman-would ~ the burden of 
judging whether a particular piece of information s~ould 
be released--nor could that responsibility legally be 
vested in him. The Government alone has this ultimate 
burden of responsibility. 
25
"Managing the News," The New York Times, October 
31, 1962. 
26President John F. Kennedy, Presidential Press Con-
ference, November 20, 1962. 
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The cry of "managing the news" should not be raised 
lightly. "The overwhelming majority of newsmen would pre-
fer to see the issue of news management die. 'The issue has 
been demagogued out of all proportion by the freedom of in-
formation zealots and the thoughtless remarks of Arthur 
Sylvester,' insists Peter Lisagor of The Chicago Dailr 
~.n27 
Neither should the critics cry out "censorship," 
lest it bring a general distrust of the governm~nt that is 
not warranted. The President's position on "censorship" 
has been, I think, misrepresented. After the Bay of Pigs 
affair there were many protests about news suppression. 
He suggested that, if the newspapers wanted him to set up 
an Office of War Information similar to that of World War 
II, he would be glad to do so. 
The Office of War Information was not an.office of 
censorship. Rather, it was a central bureau to which 
journalists might turn for counsel when they were in doubt 
as· to whether any information they desired to publish might 
threaten aational security. 
This proposal was distorted into a statement that 
censorship was being advocated and freedom of the press 
27Newsweek,: op. cit., p. 63. 
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threatened. This is not the case at all. 
What then are the answers to these various dilem-
mas? Was the President stating a truism when he said, 
"Pernaps there is no answer to the dilemma faced by a free 
and open society in a cold and secret war." The answers 
are difficult to ascertain but there are some principle~ 
that must guide the actions of those concerned with the 
problem of freedom of information. 
The newspapers must ask, before they print "news," 
is it in the national interest? It is not enough for the ~, 
I 
press t~ be free, it must be responsible also. 
The Government must recognize that there are grave 
dangers in censorship, by any name, and that any "managing 
of the news" must be done with the utmost caution and under 
constant scrutiny. 
Ix the government of the United States cannot main-
tain a Wholesome partnership with the people of the 
United States by trusting them with full information 
to which they feel they are entitled, then the people28 will not trust their government, and they should not. 
In sum, the flow of information must be as free 
and as full as possible, but account must be taken of the 
truly essential needs of national security. There must, 
...... "' ~ . 
in other words, be a careful balance maintained between the 
Right to Know and the Need to Know. 
28Kent Cooper, op. cit., p. 309. 
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CHAPTER IV 
SEEKING THE BALANCE 
The Unanswered Questions 
If the purpose of this study is to be realized, 
then the discussion should have provided the reader with 
enough information to allow him to answer same of the per~ 
plexing questions that have been raised, to his own satis-
factiono There should, however, be at least one question 
left unanswered; that being, h2! do we achieve the required 
balance that has been constantly pointed out? 
It is the purpose of this final chapter to attempt 
to answer that question and to summarize the essence of 
that which has been discussed in the preceding three chap-
terso 
Government Information is Vital 
The question asked above deals with how the balance 
is to be achievedo Prior to answering that, however, I 
think it is vital that we discuss !h2 is in a position to 
materially contribute to the balanceo It is, I believe, 
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the government information officer who will, more and more, 
find himself in the precarious position of providing (or 
-
at least substantially contributing to) the delicate bal-
·ance required between the right of the public to true, full, 
and unbiased information (The Right to Know), and the neces-
sity of withholding certain information which would, if 
released, be detrimental to national security (The Need to 
Know). 
This is not to say that the government information 
officer will make all the majo~ decisions on what will or 
will not b~ released to the public. However, I think it is 
• ! 
fairly obvious to even the casual observer that he does ex-
ert a tremendous influence in determining, both directly 
and indirectly, what information will be disseminated to 
the public. As we ~ave discussed preyiously, the judgment 
factor assumes even greater importance when seen in this 
context. There are a few people in government (including 
.some military commanders of the "old Army schoql")~ as 
well as a few industrial executives, that still adhere .to 
the now outmoded, "the public be damned" concept. Here 
the government information officer (GIO), or the civilian 
public relations man, must step up and advise his boss (or 
I 
·commander) of the pitfalls of such a policy. 
Although the government practices public relations 
in a manner similar to business corporations and private 
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organizations, there is a marked difference in the conduct 
of the practice due to the rather unique problems and re-
sponsibilities facing the government. 
"The maze of government needs to be explained, 
interpreted, and clarified,"! and this can only be accom-
plished by a government operation that makes itself "· •• 
so adequate, both in reputation and facilities, that the 
voice of the government can be heard and believed above 
. ' 
the confusion which a democracy necessarily brings forth."2 
~h~ unique responsibilities of the government are 
well stated by an expert in both public relations and po-
litical science when Dr. Bernard Rubin, in his unique and 
info~ative Public Relations and the Empire State says, 
The United States. was founded on the belief that 
the sanction for all governmental power comes di-
rectly from the people. Basic to this conception 
is the cross=reference system which is called rep-
resentative democracy: The will qf the people is 
reflected in governmental policy; the work of all 
governmental units is under the constant scrutiny 
of the people. 
Essential to this way of life, then, is an in-
formed public. The people must have the facts so 
that they may be adequately prepared to judge'men 
and policies .••. Under such a system, the pro-
viding of information to further popular 
1scott M. Cutlip and Allen H. Center, Effective 
Public .Relations, op. cit., p. 351 •.. 
2A. H. Feller, "OWI on the Homefront," Public 
Opinion Quarterly (Spring, 1943), p. 56. 
understanding of the operations of democracy is a 
prime responsibility of those in authority.J 
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Dr. Rubin goes on to say that there has been a "· •• tre-
mendous growth of the public relations concept in govern-
ment. n 4 
Adding even more weight to the argument that the 
\ 
government information officer can (and does) exert tre-
mendous influence, Zechariah Chafee, Jr. says, 
Government information can play a vital part in the 
~ause of good administration by exploring the im-
pact of new social forces, discovering strains and 
tensions before they become acute, and encouraging 
a positive sense of unity and national direction.5 
Public relations, having been defined as "the man-
, 
I 
agement function:which evaluates public attitudes, identi-
fies the policies--~and procedures •· • • with the public in-
terest and executes a program of action to earn public un-
derstanding and accepta~ce,"6 should be a legitimate, well 
' 3Bernard Rubin, Public Relations and the Empire 
State, op. cit., p. 10. 
4Ibid. 
-
5zechariah Chafee, Jr., Government aad Mass Communi-
cations (Chicago: University of chicago Press, 1947),· 
P•' 736. 
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supported, irreproachable function of our government. Axi-
omatic as this appears to be, there are many groups and 
individuals opposed to such a view, as has been pointed 
out in this study. 
There exists a double standard which many citizens 
apply to the public relations function of government and 
private enterprise. The public generally accepts the 
right of business to publicize and advertise even·though 
the customer eventually pays for it. On the other hand 
many people consider government information activities a 
waste of time and of the taxpayer's money. This is an 
unfortunate and uneducated point of view. In our demo-·. 
cratic society the government is the servant of the peopxe 
and has respo~sibilities to all--the very nature of repre-
sentative government requires that the people be informed 
as completely as possible, consistent with national secur-
ity, and as honestly as possible by those who govern them, 
for only an informed electorate can make the decisions 
necessary in a democracy. As one newspaperman so keenly 
observed; 
While the information program of many Washing-
ton agencies are far from perfec~, and are beset 
by-·numerous-ti.nsolved programs, they nevertheless 
contribute substant~y to building up an informed 
body of public opinion. They are an essential 
part of a democratic government.7 
Fundamental Conflicts of Interest 
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Although the public relations function has existed 
in government as long (if not lo~ger) as in~any other 
·_fie~d-~. there ·cot:t~f:nues to be a great deal of suspicion and 
,t 
hostility toward it. This hostility stems from fundamental 
conflicts of interest inherent in our democratic form of 
government. These conflicts, discussed at length in the 
study, are: 
1. The continuing struggle between our free press 
fighting for the people's right to know,,_ and the officials 
of the government who must decide what information may be 
disseminated to the people that will not endanger them. 
2. The continuing fight for the balance of power 
between the legislative and executive branches of our gov-
ernment. 
3. The never ending struggle for power between 
the major political parties. The "out" party always 
fears the power of powerful "propagandists" in keeping the 
"ins" in and the "outs" out . 
. 
7nick Fitzpatrick, "Public Information Activities 
of Government Agencies," Public Opinion Quarterly (Winter, 
1947-1948), p. 538. 
The government informa ti·pn officer is very often 
caught in the vortex of these encompassing conflicts. · 
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Because the people's right to know is at a maximum 
when dealing with the government, but their ability to 
know is at a minimum (due to the incr~ase in size and com-
plexity, discussed previously), the government information 
officer assumes even greater significance in his attempt to 
provide the required balance... Cutlip and Center stress 
this same point when they say, 
As the impact and extent of government increase, 
the need for ad~quate communication between public 
official and citizen becomes more urgent. Yet 
inescapable forces tend to drive them farther and 
farther apart. This problem is being met, to some 
degree, by public relations.8 
Additionally, all information officers of the gov-
ernment are bound by certain limitations on their use of 
persuasive techniques. Generally speaking, the GIO's 
function is to inform ~ to persuade. As a reliable, of-
ficial source of information, the government information 
man is honor bound to respect the truth. "It is obvious 
that governmental public relations practitioners must 
strive to avoid what has already proved to be lamentable 
8scott M. Cutlip and Allen H. Center, Effective 
Public Relations, op. cit., p. 350. 
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commercial practices."9 
I firmly believe that a well informed public with 
all the true facts will arrive at the correct conclusions 
and make intellige~t, proper decisions. If, however, we 
fail to inform the people, I expect they will make their 
dec~sions anyway. But then these decisions will be based 
on either misinformation or lack of information. The in-
formation officer, responsible for the dissemination of 
ideas, is constantly 
. • • confronted by a dilemma: he must • • • forego 
the use of certain techniques of persuasion. • • . 
He must cheose between being a less than fully ef-
fective technician and a scrupulous human being or 
an effective technician and a less than scrupulous 
human being.lO 
Summing·up my belief that it is the government in-
formation officer who will find himself in the precarious 
position of providing the delicate balance between the need 
for citizens of our democracy to know what their government 
is doing and the need to protect information important 
9Bernard Rubin, Public Relations and the Empire 
State, o~. cit., p. 71. For further enlightenment see 
pp. 71-7 for five "guideposts for the conscientious pub-
lic relations practitioner" in government. 
10Robert Merton, "Mass Persuasion: The Moral Dimen-
sion;" in Bernard Berelson and Morris Janowitz (eds~, Reader 
in Public Opinion and Communication (Glencoe, Ill.: The 
Free Press, 1953), p. 465. 
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to the defense 9f the United States, are these words of the 
then Director of Information, Office of the Secretary of 
the Air Force, Major General Arno H. Luehman. Speaking of 
the job of the information officer, he said, "He is als~ 
the public's advocate for the rights of a free press. It 
is his duty to advise his superiors of the hazards of unnec-
essary withholding of information ••.. n 11 
Any unnecessary withholding of information by the 
government violates the maxim that a "government by popular 
will attains its maximum stature only when it rests on a 
public opinion which is not only free, but is also informed 
and inteiligent."12 
This discussion, while intended as a prelude to 
answ~ring the question of how we achieve the required 
balance, may also engender in the reader some feeling of 
commiseration for the people (government information offi-
cers or not) who must wrestle with the problem of releasing 
information. 
As I have constantly pointed out, there is a need 
for balance. This balance between the right to know and 
I 
11Arno H. LuehlJ]an, Major General, USAF," ''The Infor: 
mation Job," Air University Quarterly Review, Volume XIII, 
No. 2 (Fall, 1961), p. 5. 
12Byron Price, "Maintaining a Healthy Public Opin: 
ion," Public Opinion Quarterly (Summer, 1945), p. 140. 
the need to know, as discussed in the st~dy, remains an 
elusive ideal. It seems to vanish just as we approach 
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it. The dual weights of responsibility of the govern-
ment, to increase the flow of information to the people 
while protecting, in their behalf, sensitive information 
valuable to our enemies, approach a state of equilibrium 
only to be upset by a "Cuban Crisis" or a "U-2 Affair§" 
I do not feel that the balance is upset deliberately--
except in the interest of national security, or because of 
' 
an error in judgment. "Human error is of constant concern 
to all of us," said the number one information officer of 
the Department of Defense, "and we bend our efforts to dis-
cover it and correct it, and to review our guidance and 
our procedures to minimize it."13 
Space Age Information Checklist 
In an effort to minimize such errors, since it is 
recognized that we cannot eliminate them complet~ly, I 
feel that it will be valuable to list the factors (in 
. ' 
checklist form) that the -government information officer 
13Arthur Sylvester, Statem~nt Before the Foreign 
Operatio~s and Government Information Subcommittee, op. cit., 
pp. 2-3. 
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(or anyone else who finds himself faced with the problem) 
. . 
should consider in seeking the re~uired balance. 
This being the space age, with such heretofore 
unheard of words as apogee, perigee, blastoff, etc., be-
coming well known household terms, I feel certain the use 
of the word "checklist" will be understood without further 
explan~tion. In devising this checklist, or "model," per-
haps it will be better received if I coin my own space age 
term. Let us then refer to this checklist as one for space 
age information (SPAINFO), intended to assist the user dis-
seminate information rapidly with as little chance of com-
mittimg an error in judgment, o~~f inadvertently releasing 
information that may be of value to an enemy, as possible. 
The following questions are offered as a checklist 
to the government practitioner in an attempt to aid him in 
achieving the balance: 
1. Is this information true? In spite of the 
fact that this seems to be an obvious question, I think it 
I 
is an excellent starting point. The government information 
officer cannot be a party to the dissemination of a lie. 
He must do what he can:to prevent a reoccurrence of a 
' . 
situation like the u~2 affair of May, 1960. In that case 
(as in most others) silence, as opposed to a lie, would 
have been golden. 
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2. Is this information, even though it is true, 
a manipulation of the truth? Th~ information pers~~nel 
of the govermment, as one of the mos~ important links be= 
tween the government and the people, must never allow 
themselves to become associated with those "who ignore 
the public trusteeship of their institution, who give 
only one side of the picture, who deal in half-truths or 
whole lies. n 14 
3. Will this information be detrimental to our 
national security and/or defense? It is a temptation in 
many cases to an~wer this question the easy way--in the 
aff~rmative. However, before a final judgment is made, 
the individual should satisfactorily answer the question 
of how it will adversely effect the Nation, taking into 
~onsideration also, ~he next question. 
4. Will this information be of more value to our 
own people than to the enemy? This is particularly ger-
mane to scientific information which, in many cases, is 
14George F. Milton, "The Function of the News-
paper," Public Opinion in a Democracy (New York, January, 
1938), p. 55. Special Supplement to the Jan~ary, 1938 
issue of Public Opinion Quarter!~ as quoted in Bernard 
Rubin, Public Relations and thempire State, op. cit., 
p. 67. 
\ 
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published in some obscure (uncla:ssi'fied) Journal already 
pos~~ssed by the opposition. By withholding such informa-
tion we deny it only to our own people. 
5. Will the lack of this information, if withheld, 
cause the opinion that is formed to be wrong? This is one 
of the most vi tal yet insidi_ous aspects of the prob~em of 
freedom of information. I.t is usually beyond the realm of 
classified information, dealing with such.things as may 
tend to make the administration in power look ba~. For ex-
ample, if President Kennedy had made a "deal" with Premier 
Khrushchev that in return for the Russians backing down in 
Cuba (making the Administration look good), the United 
States would allow the Communist foothold to remain and 
stop the raids of the "Cuban refugees," the disclosure 
of such information would certainly reverse the opinion 
that was formed in October, 1962. "The governmental pub-
lic relations officer must pr.esent to the public the in-
formation that is the principal substance in the popular 
decision-making process."15 
6. Will suppression of' this information, if it 
becomes known, cause the people to disbelieve, and lose 
15Bernard Rubin, Public Relations and the ~mpire 
State, pp~ cit., pp. 72-73. ' 
' 
.. 
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faith in, their own government? If the answer to this even 
wavers toward the affirmative, the duty of the GIO seems 
quite clear--to prevent suppressiono 
7. Will this information cause undue anguish? 
This deals with the type of information that is usually of 1: 
n \ 
a personal nature, such as the notification of next of kin i! 
following a disaster. Suppression or withholding of the 
I \ 
names is certainly justifiable in cases like these for it 
would be inhuman to have a parent le~rn of the loss of a 
son (for example) through the cold impersonality of the 
mass media. 
8. Do I have !!1 of the facts that are available 
on this particular subject? 
9. Have I considered a11 of the implications and 
ramifications of this information? 
10. Ha·s this information been coordinated with the 
·necessary agencies and personnel prior to release? 
While this checklist does not presume to be a pana-
cea for the problem of freedom of informatiop, perhaps it 
will in some small way, help point out the dangers of 
unneces~ary withholding of information--9r, put into space 
age vernacular, perhaps this SPAINF.O--CL (space age infor-
mation check list) will help prevent "securecy" (see Chap-
ter I, footnote 24). 
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The Final Solution 
Almost as if he were speaking of the very balance 
we seek, Zechariah Chafee, Jr., said, 
The men who propose suppressions, ••• speak much 
of the dangers against which they are guarding, 
but they rarely consider the new dangers which they 
are creating or the great value of what they are 
taking away.l6 
Perhaps the final solution, if indeed there ex-
ists such a possibility, was inadverte~tly illuminated 
when·Mr. _Sylvester himself, testifying before the Foreign 
Operations and Government Information Subcommittee, said, 
I am not a public relations man. I may need one--but 
I am not one, and I'm not trying to be one.l7 
Perhaps he should get one-~or try to be one--for 
it is obvious that more and more, it is the government in-
formation officer who must provide the delicate balance re-
quired between The Right to Know and The Need to Know. 
16
zachariah Chafee, Jr., The Blessings of Libert~ (New York and Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 19 6), 
p. 115,as quoted in Bernard Rubin, "Secrecy, Security, and 
Freedom of Information: Several Problem Areas," op. cit., 
p. 206. 
17Arthur Sylvester~ Statement, March 25, 1963, 
op. cit., p. 15. 
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APPENDIX A 
This chronology has been compiled from many and 
varied sources such as: 
The New York Times 
The Stars and Stripes (Pacific edition) 
The Washington Daily News 
The Washington Post 
The Washington Evening Star 
The Boston Globe 
Aviation Week and Space Technology 
Time 
-.· 
Newsweek 
The Air Force Times 
UoSo News and World Report 
Congressional Digest 
The., Cop.gressional Record 
~~ :~ 
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January 1, 1959: President Batista flees Cuba. 
JaRuary 2, 1959: Fidel C~~tro proclaims a pro-
visional government headed by Manuel Urrutia as the Presi-
dent. 
Janu~ry 7, 1959: The United States recognizes the 
Cuban Government. 
January 7, 1959: The Communist Party paper Hoy 
appears in Havana for the first time since 1953. 
April 15, 1959: Prime Minister Castro visits the 
United States indicating he has not come asking for ~oney. 
July 13, 1959: President Urrutia appeared on 
television and stated that connnunism is not really concerned 
with the welfa,re.of the people, and that it constitutes a 
danger to the\ Cuban revolution. 
July 17, 1959: In a television appearance, Castro 
resigns as the Prime Minister and accuses President Urrutia 
of treason because of his July 13th speech. Urrutia re-
signs. 
July 26, 1959: Castro announces he will resume the 
position of Prime Minister. 
December 31, 1959: Cuba and Communist China sign 
trade agreements under which Cuba is to sell Peip.~ng !?0, 000 
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tons of sugar. 
January 11, 1960: The U.S. protests the seizure of 
American property in recent weeks by Cuban officials. 
! 
January 26, 1960: President Eisenhower reaffirms 
the U.S. policy of non-intervention in the domestic af-
fairs of other countries, including Cuba. 
February 13, 1960: Cuba and the Soviet Union sign 
a trade and economic aid agreement. The Soviets are to buy 
one million tons of Cuban sugar in each of the next five 
years--in addition, the Soviets extend 100 million dollars 
credit for the purchase of equipment. 
March 4, 1960: The French munitions ship La Coubre 
explodes in Havana harbor--Castro identifies the U.S. as 
the responsible agent. This charge is denied three days 
later by the U,. S • 
May 6, 1960: A Cuban Coast Guard patrol ship fires 
(without warning) upon the U.S. submarine Sea Poacher on 
the high seas, some eleven miles from the Cuban coast. 
May 8, 1960: Cuba and the Soviet Union establish 
diplomatic relations. 
June 29, 1960~ The Cuban Government seizes the 
Texaco and.Esso refineries on the grounds that they had 
violated ·cuban law by refusing to refine Soviet crude oil. 
July 3, 1960: The Congress of the U.S. gives the 
President the authority to reduce our import quota on 
Cuban sugar. 
July 9, 1960: Soviet Premier Krushchev states 
that the U.S.S.R. is "raising its voice and extending a 
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helpful hand to the people of Cuba. • • 0 In case of neces-
sity, Soviet artillerymen can support the Cuban people with 
rocket fire." 
July 23, 1960: Cuba signs a five year trade and 
payment agreement with Communist China, calling for the 
Chinese to buy 500,000 tons of Cuban sugar in each of the 
next five years. 
August 29, 1960: The Foreign Ministers of the 
American Republics, meeting at San Jose, Costa Rica, ap-
prove the Declaration of San Jose, stating that the ac-
ceptance by an American state of "extracontinental inter-
vention" endangers AmericaR solidarity and security. 
September 2, 1960: In reply to the Declaration 
of San Jose, Prime Minister Castro presents the ''Declara .. 
tion of Havana" which bitterly attacks the United States 
and the.Organization of American States, denounces U.S. 
intervention in Latin America, accepts an offer of aid 
from the·soviet Union, and denies that the Soviet Union 
or Red China have any interventionist intentions in the 
Western Hemisphere. Says that Cuba will establish rela-
tions with the Chinese People's Republic. 
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September 21, 1960: Castro and Krushchev meet in 
New York. 
October 19, 1960: The U.S. prohibits exports to 
Cuba except for nonsubsidized foodstuffs, medicines, and 
medical supplies. 
November 18, 1960: The u.s. states that at least 
twelve Soviet ships have delivered arms and ammunition to 
Cuba since July, 1960 and that Soviet bloc arms to Cuba 
amount to at least 28,000 tons. 
December 16, 1960: President Eisenhower sets the 
Cuban sugar quota at zero for the first quarter of 1961. 
December 19, 1960: Cuba and the Soviet Union 
sign a joint communique through which Cuba openly aligns 
itself with the Soviet Unio:m• .and :indicates its sotidar:Lty 
with the Sino~Soviet bloc. 
January 2, 1961: Prime Minister Castro demands 
that the u.s. Embassy in Hava~ be reduced to eleven offi-
cials within forty-eight hours. 
January 3, 1961: The U.S. terminates diplomatic 
and consular relations with Cuba in view of Castro's demand, 
which placed crippling limitations, on the ability of the 
... 
United States to carry out normal diplomatic and consular 
) 
functions. Cuba turns over ~ts diplomatic and consular 
affairs to the Embassy of C2;.echoslovakia in Washington. 
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March 31, 1961: President Kennedy, in line with 
previous Eisenhower actions, fixes the Cuban sugar quota 
for 1961 at zero. 
April, 1961: The u.s. State Department states in 
a pamphlet on Cuba, that since mid-1960 more than 30,000 
tons of ~~s, with an estimated value of $50 million, have 
arrived in Cuba from beyond the Iron Curtain. In addition, 
the Cuban armed forces are dependent on the .. Soviet ·bloc 
. . . 
for maintenance and that Soviet and Czech military advisers 
/ 
and technicians have accompanied the arms. The pamphlet 
went on to say that Cubans have gone to Czechoslovakia and 
the Soviet Union for training as jet pilots, maintenance 
crews, and artillerymen, and that Cuba has (except for the 
u.s.) the largest ground forces in the hemisphere, at least 
ten times as large as those maintained by previous Cuban 
Governments, including that of Batis·ta. 
April 17=19, 1961: Cubans (and some Americans) are 
turned back in an attempt to free Cuba from Castro and-Com-
munism .. in the Bay of Pigs invasion. 
April 20, 1961: President Kennedy states that any 
"unilateral American intervention" would have be~n contrary 
to our international obligations, but we do not intend to 
abandon Cuba. 
December 2, 1961: Castro affirms that, "I believe 
absolutely in Marxims • • • I am a Marxist-Leninist and 
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will be a Marxist~Leninist until the last day of my life." 
January 31, 1962~ The Foreign Ministers of the 
American Republics, meeting at Punta del Este, Uruguay, 
dec~are that as a consequence of its public alignment 
with the international Communist movement, the present 
Marxist-Leninist government of Cuba is excluded from par-
ticipation in the inter-American system and any of the 
bodies of the OAS. 
APPENDIX B 
REPORT TO THE PEOPLE 
OCTOBER 22, 1962 
PRESIDENT KENNEDY 
·i 
This Governmeat, as promised, has maintained the 
closest surveillance of the Soviet military build-
up on the island of Cuba. Within the past week un-
mistakable evidence has established the fact that a 
series of offensive missile sites is now in prepara-
tion on that"imprisoned island. The purpose of 
these bases can be none other than to provide a nu-
clear strike capability against the Westerp Hemi-
sphere. 
Upon receiving the first preliminary hard inc 
formation of this nature last Tuesday morning 
[October 16] at 9:00a.m., I directed that our sur-
veillance be stepped up. And having now confirmed 
and completed our evaluation of the evidence and 
our decision on a course of action, this Government 
feels obliged to report this new crisis to you in 
fullest detail. 
The characteristics of the new missile sites 
indicate two distinct types of installations. Sev-
eral of them include medium-range ballistic missiles 
capable of carrying a nuclear warhead for a distance 
of more than 1,000 nautical miles. Each of these 
missiles, in short, is capable of striking Washlng-
ton, D.C., the Panama Canal, Cape Canaveral, Mexico 
City, or any other city in the southeastern part of 
the United States, in Central America, or in the 
Caribbean area. 
Additional sites not yet completed appear to be 
designed for intermediate-range ballistic missiles 
capable of traveling more than twice as far--and 
thus capable of striking most of the major cities 
in the Western Hemisphere, ranging as far north as 
H4dson Bay, Canada, and as far south as Lima, Peru. 
In addition, jet bombers, capable of carrying nu-
clear weapons, are now being uncrated and assembled 
in Cuba, while the necessary air bases are being 
prepared. 
Th~~ urgent transformation of Cuba into an im-
portant strategic base--by the presence of these 
large, long-range, and clearly offensive weapons 
of sudden mass destruction--constitutes an explicit 
threat to the peace and security of all the Americas, 
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in flagrant and deliberate defiance of the Rio Pact 
of 1947, the traditions of this nation and hemi-
sphere, tne Joint Resolution of the 87th Congress, 
the Charter of the United Nations, and my own pub-
lic warnings to the Soviets on September 4 and 13. 
Tpis action also contradicts the repeated as-
surances of Soviet spokesmen, both publicly and 
privately delivered, that the arms buildup in Cuba 
would retain its original defensive character and 
that the Soviet Union had no need or desire to 
station strategic missiles on the territory of any 
other nation. 
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The size of this undertaking makes clear that 
it has been planned· for same months. Yet only last 
month, after I had made clear the distinction be-
tween any introduction of ground-to-ground missiles 
and the existence of defensive antiaircraft missiles, 
the Soviet Government p,ublicly stated on September 
11 that, and I quote, 'The armaments and military 
~quipment sent to Cuba are designed exclusively for 
defensive purposes," and, and I quote the Soviet 
Government, "There is no need for the Soviet Govern-
ment to shift its weapons for a retaliatory blow to 
any other country, for instance Cuba," and that, and 
I quote the Government, "The Soviet Union has so 
powerful rockets to carry these nuclear warhe~ds 
that there is no need to search for sites for them 
beyond the boundaries of the Soviet UniQn~" That 
statement was false. ·· 
Only last Thursday, as evidence of .. this rapid of-
fensive build~p was already in my hand; S~yiet For-
eign Minister Gromyko told me in my office that he 
was instructed to make it clear once again, as he 
said his Government had already done, that Soviet 
assistance to Cuba, and I quote, "pursued solely 
the purpose of contributing to the defense capabil-
ities of Cuba," that, and I quote him, "training by 
Soviet specialists of Cuban nationals in handling 
defensive armame!;nts was by no means offensive," and 
that "if it were otherwise," Mr. Gromyko went on, 
"the Soviet Government would never become involved 
in rendering such assistance." That statement also 
was false. 
Neither the United States of America nor the 
world community of nations can tolerate deliberate 
aeception and offensive threats on the part of any 
nation, large or small. We no longer live in a 
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world where only the actual firing of weapons rep-
resents a sufficient challenge to a nation's secur-
ity to constitute maximum peril. Nuclear weapons 
are so destructive and ballistic missiles are so 
swift that any substantially increased possibility 
of their use or any sudden change in their deploy-
ment·may well be regarded as a definite threat to 
peace. 
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For many years both the Soviet Union and the 
United States, recognizing this fact have deployed 
strategic nuclear weapons with great care, never 
upsetting the precarious status quo which insured 
that these weapons would not be used in the absence 
of some vital challenge. Our own strategic mis-
siles have never been transferred to the territory 
of any other nation under a cloak of secrecy and 
deception; and our history, unlike that of the 
Soviets since the end of World War II, demonstrates 
that we have no desire to dominate or conquer any 
other nation or impose our system upon its people. 
Nevertheless, American citizens have become adjusted 
to living daily on the hull's eye of Soviet missiles 
located inside the U.S.S.R. or in submarines. 
In that sense missiles in Cuba add to an already 
clear and present danger--although it should be 
noted that nations of Latin America have never 
previously been subjected to a po~ential nuclear 
threat. 
But this secret, swift, and extraordinary build-
up of Communist missiles--in an area well known to 
have a special and historical relationship to the 
United States and the nations of the Western Hemi-
sphere, in violation of Soviet assurances, and in 
defiance of American and hemispheric policy--this 
sudden, clandestine decision to station strategic 
weapons for the first time outside of Soviet soil--
is a deliberately provocative and unjustified change 
in the status quo which cannot be accepted by this 
country if our courage ·and our commitments are ever 
to be trusted again by either friend or foe. 
The 1930's taught us a clear lesson: Aggressive 
conduct, if allowed to grow unchecked and unchallenged, 
ultimately leads to war. This nation is opposed to 
war. We are also true to our word. Our unswerving 
objective, therefore, must be to prevent the use 
of these missiles against this or any other country 
and to secure their withdrawal or elimination from 
the Western Hemisphere. 
Our policy has been one of patience and re-
straint, as beifts a peaceful and powerful nation, 
which leads a worldwide alliance. We have been 
determined not to be diverted from our central 
concerns by mere irritants and fanatics. But now 
further actioa is required--and it is underway; 
and these actions may only be the beginning. We 
will not prematurely or unncecessarily risk the 
costs of worldwide nuclear war in which even the 
fruits of victory would be ashes in our mouth--
but neither will we shrink from the risk at any 
time it must be faced. 
Acting, therefore, in the defense of our own 
security and of the entire Western Hemisphere, 
and uader the authority entrusted to me by the 
Constitution as endorsed by the resolution of the 
Congress, I have directed that the following 
initial steps be taken immediately: 
First: To halt this offensive buildup, a 
strict quarantine on all offensive military equip-
ment under shipment to Cuba is being initiated. 
All ships of any kind bound for Cuba from what-
ever nation or port will, if found to contain 
cargoes of offensive weapons, be turned back. 
This quarantine will be extended, if needed, to 
other types of cargo and carriers. We are not 
at this time, however, denying the necessities 
of life as the Soviets attempted to do in their 
Berlin blockade of 1948. 
Second: I have directed the continued and 
increased close surveillance of Cuba and its mili-
tary buildup. The Foreign Ministers of the OAS 
[Organization of American States] in their com-
munique of October 6 rejected secrecy on_such mat-
ters ia this hemisphere. Should these offensive 
military preparations continue, thus increasing 
the threat to the hemisphere, further action will 
be justified. I have directed the Armed Forces to· 
prepare for aay eventualities; and I trust that, 
in the interest of both the Cuban people and the 
Soviet technic~aas at the sites, the hazards to 
all concerned of continuing this threat will be 
recognized. -
Third: It shall be the policy of this nation 
to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba 
against any.~nation in the Western Hemisphere as 
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an·attack by the Soviet U~ion om the UDited States, 
requiring a full retaliatory response upon the So-
viet Uniono 
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Fourth: As a necessary military precaution I 
have reinforced our base at Guantanamo, evacuated 
today the dependents of our personnel there, and 
ordered addition~l military units to be on a stand-
by alert basis. 
Fifth: We ~re calling· tonight for an immediate 
meeting of the Organ of Consultation, under the , 
Organization of American States, to consider this 
threat to hemispheric security and to invoke articles 
6 and 8 of the Rio Treaty in support of all neces-
sary action. The United Nations Charter allows for 
regional security arrangements--and the nations of 
this hemisphere decided long ago against the military 
presence of outside powers. Our other allies around 
the world have also been alerted. 
Sixth: Uader the Charter of the United Nations, 
we are asking tonight that an emergency meeting of 
the Security Council be convoked without delay to 
take action against this latest Soviet threat to 
world peaceo Our resolution will~all for the 
prompt dismantling and withdrawal of all offensive 
weapons in Cuba, under the supervision of U.N. ob-
servers, before the quarantine can be lifted. 
Seventh and finally: I call upoD Chairman 
Khrushchev to hart an~eliminate this clandestine, 
reckless, and provocative threat to world peace and 
to stable relations between our two nations. I call 
upon him further to abandon this course of world 
domination and to join in an historic effort to end 
the perilous arms race and transform the history of 
man. He has an opportunity now to move the world 
back from the abyss of destruction--by returning to 
his Government's own words that it had no need to 
station missiles outside its own territory, and · 
withdrawing these weapons from Cuba--by refraining -
from any ac·tion which will widen or deepen the pres.;. 
ent crisis--a~d then'by participating in a search for 
p~acefiil a:n.a··permanent. ·solutions. 
: " "Thii=! na:tian: is;-pre~ared to present its case 
against .. the Soviet tlireat to peace~· and our own pro-
posials--for a peaceful world, at any time and in any 
forum--in the OAS, in the United Nations, or in any 
other meeting that could be useful--without limiting 
our freedom of action. 
,J 
1: 
I! 
' II 
" lo 
'I 
II 
II 
II 
'I II 
I' 
II 
,I 
;I 
il 
II 
II 
:I 
!I 
!I 
li 
I! 
ol 
II 
,, 
,I 
II 
II 
.II 
II 
q 
,, 
II 
122 
We have in the past made strenuous efforts to 
limit the spread of nuclear weapons. We have pro-
posed the elimination of all arms and military bases 
in a fair and effective disarmament treaty. We are 
prepared to discuss new proposals for the removal 
of tensions on both sides--including the possibil-
ities of a. ge~uinely independent Cuba, free to de-
termine its own destiny. We have no wish to war 
with the Soviet Union, for we are a peaceful people 
who desire to live in peace with all other peoples. 
But it is difficult to settle or even discuss 
these problems in an atmosphere of intimidation. 
That is why this latest Soviet threat--or any other 
threat which is made ei~her independently or in 
response to our actions this week--must and will 
be met with determination. Any hostile move any-
where in the world against the safety and freedom 
of peoples to whom we are committed--including in 
particula~ the brave people of West Berlin--will 
be met by whatever action is needed. 
Finally, I want to say a few words to the cap-
tive pe~ple of Cuba, to wham this speech is being 
directly carried by special radio facilities. I 
speak to you as a friend, as one who knows of your 
deep attachment to your fatherland, as one who 
shares your aspirations for liberty and justice 
for all. And I have watched and the American 
people. have watched with deep sorrow how your 
nationalist revolution was betrayed and how your 
fatherland fell under foreign domination. Now 
your leaders are no longer Cuban leaders inspired 
by Cuban ideals. They are puppets and agents of 
an international conspiracy which bas turned Cuba 
against your friends and neighbors in the Americas 
--and turned it into the first Latin American coun-
try to become a target for nuclear war, the first 
Latin American country to have these weapons on its 
soil. 
These aew weapons are not in your interest. 
They contribute no~hing to your peace and well be-
ing. They can only undermine it. But this.country 
has no wish to c~use you to suffer or to impose any 
system upon you. We know that your lives and land 
are being used as pawns by those who deny you free-
dom. 
Many times in the past the Cuban people have 
risen to throw out tyrant~ who destroyed their 
liberty. · And i .have no qoubt that most Cubans 
today look forward to. the time when they will 
be truly free--free from foreign domination, 
.free to choose their own leaders, free to select 
their own system, free to own their own land, 
free to speak and write and worship without fear 
or degradation. And then shall Cuba be ~elcomed 
back to the society of free nations and to the 
associations of this hemisphere. 
My fellow citizens, let no one doubt that 
this is a difficult and dangerous effort on which 
we have set out. No one can foresee precisely 
what course it will take or what costs or casual-
ties will be incurred. Many months of sacrifice 
and self-discipline lie ahead-~months in which 
bot~ our patience and our will will be tested, 
months in which many threats and denunciations 
will keep us aware of our dangers. But the great-
est danger of all would be to do nothing. 
The path we have chosen for the present is 
full of hazards, as all~.paths:·are; but it is 
the one most consistent with our character and 
courage as a nation and our commitments around 
the world. The cost of freedom is always high--
but Americans have always paid it. And one path 
we shall never choose, and that is the path of 
surrender or submission. 
Our goal is not the victory of might but the 
vindication.of right--not peace at the expense 
of freedom, but both peace and freedom, here in 
this hemisphere and, we bope;-around the world. 
God willing, that goal will be achieved.. 
123 
- , 
\ ~ .... ··-· -
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
I 
I 
II· 
.. II 
II 
li 
II 
il 
II 
II !I 
:I 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
PRIMARY SOURCES 
Interviews 
Interview with Lt. Colonel William c. Anderson, USAF, 
Boston University, Boston, Mass., 26 February 
1963. 
Interview with Major James E. Baldwin, USAF, Langley 
Air Force Base, Va., 1 March 1963. 
Interview with Captain William F. Palmer, USAF, Seymour 
Johnson Air Force Base, N~C~, 2 March 1963. 
Interview with Captain Harry Payne, USAF, Seymour Johnson 
Air Force Base, N.C., 2 March 1963. 
Letters 
Letter to the author from Captain George B. Anderson, USAF, 
APo 63, San Francisco, Calif., February, 1963. 
Letter to the author from Captain Frank Blackburn, USAF, 
APO 130, New York, N.~., February, 1963. 
Publications, U.S. Government 
Air Force Manual 10-4. Guide for Air Force Writing. 
Washington, D.C.: Department of the Air ·Force, 
1 'April 1960. · 
Air Force Manual 190-5. Field Press Censorship. Washington, 
D.C.: Department o~ the Air Force, August, 1954. 1 
II 
li 
1\ 
II 
ii 
II 
II 
tl 
II 
:I 
I! 
rl 
II 
!I 
I! 
II 
II 
II 
II 
i\ 
tl 
126 
Air Force Regulation 190-6. Ait Force Information Program. 
Washington, D.C.: Department of the Air Force, 
2 December 1960. 
Air Force Regulation 190-12. Information Services--Release 
of Information. Washington, D.C.: Department of 
the Air·:r~F.~rce, 18 Dec~mber 1.~.9.0. · ·"'"n • r ;$ 
Air Force Regulation 205-1. Safeggarding Militarb Informa-
tion. Washington, D.C.: Department of t e Air 
force, 10 Jume 1960 (Includimg changes through 
5 October 1962). 
Air Training~CQ~~nd Manual 5Q~~~ Freedom and Professional 
Leadershil. Randolph Air Force Base, Texas: 
Air T~~i~_ng Command,~t M~y 1~62. 
Kennedy, J'ohn.,F~c Report to the Peobl~, October 22,11962. 
U.S~" ·Department of State Pu iication 7449. Wash-
ington, D.D.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
The 
The 
u.s. 
o~tob.e~.;tr 1962. ·- · · 
• • :;!' 1-
Declarafion:ot Inde~endence and The Constitution of the 
United States o AiDerica. ··A House Document re.., ... · 
printed by order of the 84th Congress, 2nd Session. 
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1956. 
President's Science Advisory Committee (A Report of). 
Science0 Government, and Information. Washington, D.C.: .s. Government Printing Office, January 10, 
1963. 
Advisory Commission on Information. The Sixteenth Re-
~ort of the u.s. Advisory Commission on Information. 
asbington, D.C.:· u.s. Government Printing Office, 
January, 1961. 
U.S. Congr~ss, House, Committee on Government Operations. 
Availability of Information From Federal Depart- -
ments and Agencies~ House Report No. 2947. Wash-
ington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1956. 
" 
'I 
II 
'I 
II 
" II 
i[ 
II 
il 
II 
II 
II 
!I 
II 
II 
II 
II 
l1 
)1 
I 
I 
I 
[I 
11 
il 
!i 
II 
127 
U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations. 
Availability of Information ·From Federal Degart· .. 
ments and Afencies. Part 5--Department of efense. 
Hearings be o~e the Subcommittee, July 9, 10, and 
12, 1956. Wa~hington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1956. 
u.s. 
u.s. 
u.s. 
u.s. 
Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations·. 
Availability of Information From Federal DeBart-
meats and Afeacies. Part ?--Department ofefense. 
Hearings be ore the Subcommittee, November 13, 14, 
and 15, 1956. Washington, D.C.: u.s. Government 
Printing Office, 1957. 
Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations. 
Availability of Info;mation From Federal Depart-
ments and Afencies. Part 8--Department of Defense. 
Hearings be ore the Subcommittee, March 11 and 
12,, 1957. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1957. 
Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations. 
Availability of Information From Federal Degart-
ments and Afencies. Part 9--Departmeat ofefense. 
Hearings be ore the Subcommittee, April 10, 11, 
and 12, 19 57. Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government 
Printing Office,'· 1957. ·:. 
U.S. Department of State. Background. Publication 6861. 
u.s. Government Printing Office, 
u.s. 
Washington, D.C.: 
November, 1959. 
Department of State. Five Goals of u.s. Forei'n 
Policy. Publication 7432, General Foreignolicy 
Series 183. Washington, D.C.: u.s. Government 
Printi~g Office, October, 1962. 
U.S. Senate, Contradictions of Communism, Report by the 
Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of 
the Internal Security Act and Other Internal 
Security Laws to the Committee on the Judiciary. 
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1959. 
II 
'I il 
,, 
II 
II 
!I 
II 
II 
.I 
II 
li 
i! 
[II 
II 
II 
11 
II 
II 
II 
'I 
!I 
II 
!I 
II 
1: 
II 
,, 
II 
i: 
il 
II 
I' 
.I 
'I 
II 
!I 
II 
II 
!I 
'I 
128 
U.S. Senate, Military Cold War Education and Speech Review 
Policies, Report by the .Special Prepare4ne$s Sub- -
committee of the Committee on Armed Servic~s. Wash-
ington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1962. 
u.s. Senate, The New Drive Against the Anti-Communist Pro-
~' ·Hearing Before the Subcomm~ttee to 1 lnvestlg~te 
~Administration of the Internal Security Act 
and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee 
on the Judiciary. Washington, D.C.: u.s. Govern:-
ment Printing Office, 1961. 
U.S. Senate, Wordsmanship--Semantics as a Communist Weapon, 
S~udy Prepared for the Subcommittee to InvestlgaF~ 
the Administration of the Internal Security Act 
and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee 
on the Judiciary. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1961. 
Miscellaneous 
Gerrity, Thomas P. Lt. General, USAF. Address to Combined 
Colorado Press Organizations, Denver, Colorado, 
2Q September 1962. CMimeographed.) 
Herter, Chtistian A. Statement for the Press. The White 
Hquse. May 9, 1962. (Mimeographed.) 
Hovey, Graham. "Background of the News," Broadcasts over 
Station WHA, Madison Wisconsin, February 5th and 
19th, 1956 (Mimeographed). 
Kennedy, John F. Presidential Press Conference, November 
20' -1962 0 
Panel Discussion. (Live). 
"The Legislature, The Courts and The Right to Know." 
Moderator:· Joseph M. Harvey, Legal Editor, Bos'ton 
Globe. 
Discussion Leader: Honorable Elijah Adlow, Chief 
Justice~ Municipal Court of the City of Boston. 
Discussants: William Schofield, Chief Editorial 
Writer, Boston Traveler. 
John E. Powers, President of the Massachusetts 
Senate. 
•, 
'I 
II 
'I II 
II 
'I 
I• !I 
I 
It 
II 
ll 
'I 
II 
It 
il 
:I 
II 
II 
il 
I' 
,I 
I' 
I! 
I' 
•I 
I' 
I' 
il 
II 
II 
!I 
•I 
It 
If 
II 
f, 
" 
,, 
I; 
II 
!I 
i! 
II 
I' II 
,j 
!! 
129 
Edmund L. McNamara, Police Commissioner of Boston. 
Wilmer C. Swartley, Vice President, Westinghouse 
Broadcasting Co., Inc. 
,Law Day Institute Program, May 1, 1963. Bos.ton: 
University (SPRC), Boston, Massachusetts. _ 
Panel Discussion. (Live). 
''Th.e Responsibility of the Communication Media 
and the Right to Know." _ 
Moderator: John D. Maloy, Director of Programs, 
WNA:c-tv. 
Discussion Leader: Louis Lyons, Curator of Nieman 
Fellowship, Harvard University. 
Discussants: John Day, Public Affairs Director, 
WHDH-TV. 
Donald B. Snyder, Publisher, The Atlantic Monthly. 
Hono~able John J. Connelly, Justice of Boston 
Juvenile Court. 
William C. Chaplis, Staff Photographer, Associated 
Press. 
Law Day Institute Program, May 1, 1963. Boston 
University (SPRC), Boston, Massa~husetts. 
Pope, James s. "Problems of Joumalism," Address to the 
American Society of Newspaper Editors1; 1950. (Mimeographed). 
Ransom, Harry H. Government Secrec~ and National Security: 
An Amalysis. Serial No. 12 . Harvard University 
Defense Policy Seminar, January 6, 1958. (Mimeo-
graphed.) 
Report of Committee on Classified Information, made· to the 
Secretary of Defense, Noyember 8, 1956. Charles A. 
C~olidge, Chairman (mimeographed). 
Schooley, C. Herschel •. Remarks of the Director of Informa-
tion, Department of Defense, to the American Polit-
ical Science Association Convention Panel on Gov-
ernmeat·Information Problems, Hotel Henry Hudson, 
New Yo1;1Z; ''september 7, 1957. (Mimeographed.) 
Sylvester, Arthur. Statement of the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Puhiic Affairs,· Before the Foreign Oper-
ations and Government Information Subcommittee, 
March 25, 1963. (Mimeographed. 
I 
:I 
II 
It 
H 
I' 
II 
1: 
II 
II 
II 
:I 
'I 
li 
II 
il 
ii 
·I 
I· 
,: 
,, 
II 
I ,, 
,, 
,, 
I! 
'I !, 
'I 
li 
11 
'I II 
:I 
il 
II 
II 
!I 
" ll 
II 
·I I. 
:I 
II 
II 
II 
.I 
11 
II l 
!I 
II 
II 
II 
,, 
II 
I 
130!' 
SECONDARY SOURCES 
Books 
Abelson, Herbert I. Persuasion. New York:· Springer Pub-
lishing Company, ~nc., 1959. 
Albig, William. Modern Public Opinion. New York: McGraw-
Hill Book Company, 1956. 
Barrett, Edward W. Truth Is Our Weapon. New York: Funk 
and Wagnalls Company, 1953. 
Beroays, Edward L. Propa~anda. New York: Horace Live-
right, 1928. 
Bernays, Edward L. Public Relations. Norman, Okla.: 
University of Ok1ahom~ Press, 1952. 
Bernays, Edward L. The EngineerinG of Consent. Norman, 
Okla.: University of Ok1a oma Press, 1955. 
Brucker, Herbert. Freedom of Information. New York: 
The Macmillan Company, 1949. 
Burnham, James. The Web of Subversion. New York: The 
John Day Company, 1954. 
Campbell, William Giles. Form and Style in Thesis Writing. 
Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1954. 
Carroll, Wallace. Persuade or Perish. Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Company, 1948. 
Cater, Douglass. ~e Fourth Branch of Government. Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1959. 
Chafee, Zechariah, Jr. Freedom of S~eech. 
Harcourt·; ~race and Howe, l9 0. 
New York: 
Chafee, Zechariah, Jr. Government and Mass Communications. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947. 
Christenson, Reo and McWilliams, Robert (eds.). The Voice · 
.. of the People. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 
Inc., 1962. 
131 
Commission on Freedom of the Press. A Free and Responsible 
Press. Chicago: University of chicago Press, 
1947. 
Cooper, Kent. Barriers Down.- New York: Farrar and Rhine-
hart, Inc., 1942. 
Cooper, Kent. The Ri~ht to Know. 
Straus and Cu ahy, 1956. 
New York: Farrar, 
C+eel, George. IJow We Advertised America. New York: 
Harper a~a Brothers Publishers, 1920. 
Cross, Harold L. The People's Right to Know. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1956. 
Cutlip, Scott M. and Center, Allen H. Effective Public 
Relations. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 
Inc., 1958. 
Daugherty, William E. and Janowitz, Morris (eds.). A Psh-
chological Warfar~ Casebook. Baltimore: The Jo ns 
Hopkins Press, 1958. 
Davis, Elmer. 
D.C.: 
War Information and Censorshit. WasQington, 
American Council on Public Af airs, 1943. 
Dodd, Thomas J. Freedom and Foreifn Polic~:o 
Macf'adden-Bartell Corporat on, 196 • 
New York: 
Dyer, Murray. The Weapon on the Wall. Baltimore: The 
· Johns Hopkins Press, 1959. 
~erald,~ Edwa~d J.· The Press and the Constitution. St~ 
Pau-l, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 1948. 
Hane~~ Roger W. Comstockery in America. Boston: Beacon 
., Press, 1960. 
Harlan, Gene and Scott, Allan. Contem!orary Public Rela-
tions; Principles and Cases. ~g1ewood Cliffs, 
N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1955. . 
Harper, Robert-S. Lincoln and the Press. New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1951. 
Hughes, Frank.· Prejudice and the Press. New York: 
Devin-Adair Company, 1950. 
132 
Katz, Daniel (ed.). Public Opinion and Prola~anda. 
New York: The Dryden Press, Inc., 9 4. 
Katz, Elihu and Lazarsfeld, Paul F. Personal Influence. 
Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1955. 
Kelley, Stanley, Jr; Public Relations and Political Power. 
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Pres$, 1956. 
Lesly, Philip. Public Relations Handbook. Se·cond edition. 
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962. 
Lockhart, Robert Bruce. Comes the Reckoning. London: 
Putnam an&Company, Ltd., 1948. 
Margolin, Leo J. Paper Bullets. New York: Fro ben Press, 
1946. 
Marshall, Charles B. The Limits of Foreign Policy. New 
York: Holt and Company, 1954. 
Members of the Staff of The New York Times. The Newspaper: 
Merton, 
Its Making and Its Meaning. New York: Scribner 
and Company, 1945. 
Michael, Geo~ge. Handout. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 
1935. 
Mollenhoff, Clark R. Washington Cover-U~. 
· Doubleday and Company, Inc., 196 . 
New York: 
Morgenstern, Oscar. The Question of National Defense. 
New York: Randon House, 1959. -, 
Mott, Frank L .. and Casey, R.D. Interpretations of Journal-
ism. New York: F.S. Croft~ and Company, 1937. 
O'Brian, John Lord. National Securitl and Individual 
Freedom. Boston: Harvard Un versity Press, 1955. 
Pimlott, J.A.R. Public Relations and American Democrac~. 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 19 1. 
Rogerson, Sidney. Propa~anda in the Next War. 
_ Mackays, Ltd., 1 38. · 
London: 
Rowse, Arthur E. Slanted News. Boston: Beacon Press, 
1957. 
Rubin, Bernard. Public Relations and the Empire State. 
New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 
1958. ' 
133 
Schramm, Wilbur (ed.). Mass Communications. Urbana, Ill.: 
University of Illinois Press, 1960. 
Schramm, Wilbur. Responsibility in Mass Communication. 
New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc., 
1957. 
Schramm, Wilbur (ed.). The Process and Effects of Mass 
Communication. Urbana, Ill.: University of Ill-
inois Press, 1956. 
Seldes, George. The People Don't Know. New York: Gaer 
Associates, 1949. 
Summers, Robert E. America's Weapons of Psychological 
Warfare. New York: H.W. Wilson Company, 1951. 
Thayer, Frank. Legal Control 'of ih$ Press. Brooklyn: 
The Foundation Press, Inc. ; 1·962. 
Tully, Andrew. CIA. Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Publica-
tions, Inc., 1963. 
Ward, Barbara. The Rich Nations and the Poor Nations. 
New York~ W.W. Norton and Company, 1962. 
>• 
Wiggins, James Russ~ll. Freedom or Secrecy. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1956. 
Wise, David and Ross, Thomas B. The u ... z Affair. New York: 
Random House, 1962. 
Zelermyer, William. Invasion of Privacy. Syrac~se, N.Y.: 
Syracuse University Press, 1§59. 
134 
·Journal Articles 
Bagdikian, Ben H. "The News Managers," The Saturdal Eve-
ning Post, Volume 236, No. 15 (April 20, 19 3), 
pp. 17-19. 
Brucker, Herbert. "Newspapers Shouldn't Play God," 
Saturday Review (January 1, 1955). 
Creel, George. "The Limits of Censorship: A Symposium," 
Public Opinion Quarterly (Spring, 1942). 
"Cuba Crisis News Probe," Aviation Week and S~ace Tech-
nolo~y, Volume 77, No. 20 (November 1 , 1962), 
p. 2 0 
Davison, W.P. "On the Effects of Communication," Public 
Opinion Quarterly (Fall, 1959). 
Feller, A.H. "OWI on the Homefront," Public Opinion Quarterly (Spring, 1943). 
Fitzpatrick, Dick. "Public Information Activities of 
Government Agencies," Public Opinion Quarterly 
(Winter, 1947-1948). 
Hoover, J. Edgar. "The Struggle for the Minds of Men," 
The Airman (February, 1960). 
Hotz, Robert. "The Sour Trumpet," Aviation Week and 
S§ace Technology, Volume 77, No. 19 (November 5, 
162), p. 21. 
Hotz, Robert. "What was the Threat?" Aviation Week and 
~ace Technology, Volume 77, No. ZO (November 12, 
62), p. 21. 
"How Much Management of the News?" Newsweek, Volume LXI, 
No. 14 (April 8, 1963), pp. 59-63. 
"How News irt .'Managed' by Officials in Washington," U.S. 
· News and World Report, Volume LIV, No. 15 (April 
15, ~963), pp. 38-42. . 
Krock, Arthur. "Mr. Kennedy' s Management of the News , " 
Fortune, Volume LXVII, No. 3 (March, 1963), 
pp 0 .82' 199-202. 
Luehman, Arno H o Major General, USAF 0 "The Information 
\Job," Air Universitt 2uarterly Review, Volume 
X~II, Noo 2 (Fall, 9 1), pp. 2-9. 
135 
Lyons, Eugene. "The Great Debate: How t;o Fight the Cold· 
War," Reader's Di~est, Volume 81, No. 487 (Novem-
ber, 1962), pp. 16 -182. 
Price, Byron. "Maintaining a Healthy Public Opinion," 
Public Opinion Quarterly (Summer, 1945). 
"Report of Sigma Delta Chi Connnittee on Freedom of In-
formation," Quill, (January, 1953). 
Rourke, F}:'ancis E. "How Much Should the_ Government Tell?" 
, Saturdal Revi~w, Volume 44, No. 19 (May 13, 1961), 
pp. 17- 9 and 31. 
Sturm, Ted R. Captain, USAF (Ret.). "The Truth About 
Our Information Program," The Airman, Volume IV, 
No. 1 (January, 1960), pp. 42-47. 
"Sylvester's Sunshine Kit," Aviation Week and Slace Tech-
nology, Volume 77, No. 23 (December 3, 962), p. 25. 
"U.S. Press Is Free to Print The News but Too Often Is Not 
Free To Gather It 9 " Quill, Volume 39 (July, 1951), 
p. 9. 
White, David M. "The Gatekeeper~ A Case Study in the 
Selection and Rejection of the News," Journalism 
Quarterly (Fall, 1950). 
Newspapers 
Bartlett, Charles. "Military Shall Be Subordinate," The 
"t 
Boston .sunday_ Globe, May 12, 1963. 
"Behind·. TFX Case," The New York Times, March 21, 1963. 
Buchwald, Arthur. "Lincoln Managed the News," The Boston 
Sunday Globe,. March 3, 1963. 
Dulles, Allen W. "Dulles Discusses Secrecy," The Christian 
Science Monitor, February 19, 1963. 
i 
I 
i 
I! 
II 
11 
,, 
It 
1: 
II 
II 
!I 
II 
il 
'I 
i1 II 
1: 
II 
II 
ji 
i! 
II 
II 
I• 
II 
'I 
II 
!I 
II 
II 
I' 
r! 
136 
"Here 1 s Where We Get Off," New York Herald Tribune, October 
9, 1941. 
"Managing the News," The New York Times, October 31, 1962. 
"Mr. McNamara's Ordeal," The Christian Science Monitor, 
March 19, 1963. 
"N~ws as a Weapon," The Washington Post, November 1, 1962. 
"News Control Sets Dangerous Pattern," Tulsa Daily World, 
November 2, 1962. 
Norris, John G. "One-Man Pentagon Rule Disclaimed," The 
Washington Post, March 13, 1963. ---
' 
Ogilvie, Thomas F. Editorial in The Jersey Times, 
February 26, 1949. 
~'Pentagon Censorship," Dallas Morning News, November 2, 
-, 1962. 
Phillips, Cabell. "2 u.s. Aides Back Secrecy in Crisis," 
-, The New York Times, March 26, 1963. 
Reston, James. "Kennedy Dominating News Media," The ·Boston 
Herald, May 9, 1962. , 
"Salinger Firmly Denies Soviet Flights Over U.S.," The 
- Washington Star, December 5, 1962. -
Sokolsky, George. "Managing the News," Boston Record 
American, November 8, 1962. 
The Air Force Times, 1960-1963. 
The Stars and Stripes, Pacific edition, 1960-1962. 
"The Right Not To :Be Lied To," The New York Times, 
May 10, 1961. , 
"The Voice of a Free Press," The New York Times, January 5, 
1956. 
Walter,_ Lynde M. Editorial in The Dailfl Evening Transcript, 
April 30, 1941. [This is on t ewall, framed, at 
SPRC, Boston Univ., Mass.] 
137 
Watson, Mark S. "New Censor Rules Recall Goebbels," 
Baltimore_Sun, November 1, 1962. 
"World We Live In," The Washington Evening Star, October 
31, 1962. 
Rubin, 
Miscellaneous 
Bernard. "Secrecy, Security and Freedem of .Informa-
tion: Several Problem Areas," Toward Social Re-
sponsibilitY in ·Public Communications •. Boston: 
Institute for Public·Relations Studies, Fall, 1962. 
"The Worlds Big Spy Game," The Air Force Blue Book~~ 
1961, Volume II. New York: Military Publishing 
Institute, 1960. 
I • 
Warmer, 
' . 
George A. "Public Relations and Privacy," Toward 
Social Responsibility iaPublic Communications. 
Boston: Institute for Public Relations Studies, 
Fall, 1962. · 
